CHAPTER TWO

The Grid

OF Preoccupancy
The knowledge of bureaucratic expertise is a source of expertise, quite apart from the skills that are acquired through formal education or training. Some of this knowledge is explicit, such as the procedures for handling documents or the rules for conducting meetings. Other knowledge is tacit, such as the intuitions of career bureaucrats about how to navigate complex bureaucratic systems. This dual nature of expertise suggests that it is important to distinguish between the two forms of knowledge when thinking about how to engage with bureaucratic systems.

The presence of bureaucratic expertise in a given context can influence decision-making processes in several ways. First, it can provide critical information about the implications of different courses of action. For example, a project manager might draw on their expertise to identify potential risks and recommend strategies to mitigate them. Second, bureaucratic expertise can help to legitimize certain decisions by providing a rationale that is accepted within the context. This can be particularly important in situations where there is a need to justify actions to stakeholders or justify policies to the public. Finally, bureaucratic expertise can be a resource for problem-solving, helping to identify solutions and implement them effectively.

In conclusion, it is important to recognize the role of bureaucratic expertise in shaping decision-making processes. By understanding the nature and extent of this expertise, we can better appreciate the complex interactions that shape policy outcomes. This knowledge can be used to inform our own decision-making processes, as well as to design more effective ways of engaging with bureaucratic systems.
A monopolistic or nearly monopolistic control of the "facts" thus provides tremendous reinforcement to the power that bureaucrats possess from specialized and continuous attention to particular responsibilities.

But though organizations have inherent assets that contribute greatly to their decision-making skills, it is not these organizational characteristics alone that account for the expertise that is the hallmark of modern bureaucracy. In the modern state this expertise comes preeminently from the variety of highly trained elites who practice their trade in public organizations — physicians, economists, and engineers, for example. In the roster of professions in American society there is not a single skill that does not find extensive employment in one or more executive agencies. And several professions such as the military are employed only in the public service. Moreover, the tendency for professionals to seek employment in public as well as in private organizations is on the increase. Amritai Ezioni argues that as "the need for costly resources and auxiliary staff has grown, even the traditional professions face mounting pressures to transfer their work to organizational structures such as the hospital and the law firm."  

Of course, not all public organizations exhibit the same degree of professionalism in their employment pattern. Some administrative units like the U.S. Postal Service still hire mainly clerical employees. In other agencies, however, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the level of professionalism is very high. Agencies like NIH are in fact often described as "professional organizations," because they are dominated by individuals whose primary commitment is to the skill they practice rather than to the institution by which they are employed. Moreover, recent studies in comparative politics have shown wide differences among societies in the opportunities afforded various skill groups to influence the development of public policy. Agencies that are highly professional in their orientation and employment patterns often occupy a preferred position within the structure of public bureaucracy. State universities are commonly conceded — by law or custom — a degree of administrative independence not accorded to other public agencies. The same tradition of autonomy ordinarily protects a research agency like the Bureau of Standards from political pressures. When a professional agency enjoys such independence, the influence it exerts in all bargaining with other governmental units is greatly enhanced. In parts of the country where the standing of public higher education is at its peak, the state university has far more leverage than other agencies with the governor's office, the budget bureau, and legislative committees.

In the early history of American bureaucracy, such claims to expertise as administration could make were based largely on the factor of continuity. The expertise of the clerical employees who then staffed government agencies came from the sustained attention they gave to particular problems. And it exacted little deference from politicians. President Andrew Jackson's statement is often taken as the classic expression of widespread disdain for the skills of bureaucracy in early nineteenth-century America: "The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally gained by their experience." Since Jackson's days, however, the skills required to run the modern state have been sharply upgraded. As the innovations wrought by science and technology have increasingly complicated both the responsibilities of government and the environment in which it operates, the duties of the public service are no longer so "plain and simple" as Jackson regarded them. Moreover, with the abolition of spoils and the increasing acceptance of merit as the essential qualification necessary for public employment, there has been a growing effort to recruit experts to the public service, to provide in-service training programs designed to improve the skills of public employees once they are hired, and in a variety of other ways to encourage and enhance bureaucratic expertise. Such expertise has thus evolved from its earlier dependence on experience to its contemporary reliance on professional training.

Perhaps the one accomplishment in modern times that best exemplifies the success that expertise in bureaucracy can bring is the record of the United States space program under the administration of NASA. In this area at least, bureaucratic expertise has been widely visible and has won broad popular acclaim. In summary, it can be said that bureaucratic expertise is rooted both in the characteristics of public organizations and, increasingly, in the skills of their members. In modern times the operation of executive agencies at all levels of government demands employment of an increasingly diverse and complex range of specialized personnel. In sharp contrast to President Jackson's belief in the simplicity
of the administrator's task stands a statement by President John F. Kennedy, delivered in support of an increase in pay for government employees: "The success of this Government, and thus the success of our Nation, depend in the last analysis on the quality of our career services. The legislation enacted by the Congress, as well as the decisions made by me and the Department and Agency heads, must all be implemented by the career men and women in the federal service. In foreign affairs, national defense, science and technology, and a host of other fields, they face unprecedented problems of unprecedented importance. We are all dependent on their sense of loyalty and responsibility as well as their competence and energy."

**EXPERTISE: CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE**

Whether it stems from the characteristics of organizations or the skills of their members, bureaucratic expertise exercises influence over the development of public policy through three primary channels: (1) the ability of bureaucrats to gather information and to give advice that often shapes the decisions of political officials; (2) the capacity of bureaucratic organizations to carry on the tasks that must be performed once policy goals are decided upon — the power of implementation; and (3) as a critical dimension of this power to implement policies, the discretion with which bureaucracies are commonly vested as they carry on the work of government.

In supplying advice, the power of bureaucrats is indirect, resting as it does upon their ability to persuade political officials that a course of action should be taken. Bureaucrats have influence only if politicians are willing to take their advice. Once policies have been turned over to bureaucrats to implement, however, their power is direct. It is especially direct when, as is common practice in all political systems, bureaucrats are granted the right to exercise discretion in the execution of policy. The actual content of policy may become predominantly a matter for bureaucratic determination.

**ADVICE AS INFLUENCE**

Nothing contributes more to bureaucratic power than the ability of career officials to mold the views of other participants in the policy process. Bureaucracies are highly organized information and advisory systems, and the data they analyze and transmit cannot help but influence the way in which elected officials perceive political issues and events. Herbert Simon emphasizes the importance of being able to shape the value or factual premises of decision makers as a means of ensuring control over decisions themselves, and it is precisely in this way that bureaucratic information and advice commonly function in the policy process.

A notable illustration of this bureaucratic role was the influence exerted by George Kennan from his vantage point in the State Department in the years immediately following World War II. During this period, Kennan's arguments on the need to contain Soviet power and the methods by which this goal might be achieved did much to shape the assumptions on which American foreign policy was based in dealing with the Communist powers around the world. The views he expressed in a widely read article on foreign policy, which he wrote under the pseudonym "X," became the basic American text of the Cold War both for government officials and for attentive publics outside the government.

The influence that bureaucrats exert on the policy process through this power to give advice should not be exaggerated. The American experience during the Cold War suggests that it is easiest for bureaucrats to appear powerful when their advice matches and reinforces the preexisting views of the political officials responsible for policy. As we saw, Kennan's advice seemed highly influential in the early days of the Cold War, when the doctrine of containment was eminently congenial to the goals of leading political elites in the country. Later on, however, when Kennan attempted to restrain policy makers from putting undue emphasis upon military force in applying the principle of containment, his advice was largely ignored, and he found himself increasingly isolated from power.

Hence, the best way for a bureaucrat to acquire a reputation as the power behind the throne may be to confine himself to advice that fits in with the views of his political superiors, or to give advice only in areas in which he knows his superior has no very strong opinions. When Henry Kissinger served as special assistant for national security affairs during President Nixon's tenure in the White House, he enjoyed a wide reputation as a highly influential presidential adviser. But it is a fair assumption that Nixon initially chose Kissinger for this position precisely because his views generally coincided with Nixon's own orientation toward foreign policy.
Kissinger's role may often have been that of reinforcing Nixon's capacity to pursue policies of his own choice, serving as advocate or defender of the president with the National Security Council and the other executive agencies charged with the conduct of foreign affairs.

But though the appearance and reality of bureaucratic power may not always coincide, it is clear that the ability to channel information into policy deliberations provides substantial leverage with which bureaucrats can affect the shape of decisions. If administrators sometimes appear only to be telling political officials what they want to hear, staff members of executive agencies can substantially reshape the attitudes of political leaders in both Congress and the executive.

A notable example is the shift in the views of Clark Clifford on the Vietnam War following his appointment as secretary of defense in 1968. Clifford's transformation from a supporter to an opponent of American involvement in the war came about mostly as a result of briefings he received from his civilian staff after he took over at the Pentagon. From these briefings, Clifford became more and more critical of the war in his advice to President Johnson, and helped push the president toward accepting the idea of a negotiated settlement. 11

Another illustration of this phenomenon is the shift in President Eisenhower's views on a nuclear test-ban treaty after a change in his scientific advisers. When James Killian replaced Edward Teller and Ernest Lawrence as Eisenhower's chief source of scientific advice, the president became progressively more sympathetic to the idea of negotiating such a treaty. "James Killian brought in a wider range of technical opinion, and by exposing the President and Secretary of State to the views of experts such as Rabi and Bethe, he opened up alternatives that had not been considered before at the top levels of government." 12

Advising the President. A group of agencies in which the power of advice can be seen in its most prominent form in American administration are the staff agencies that surround the presidency, administrative units like the Council of Economic Advisers or a scientific advisory committee like the Office of Science and Technology. These agencies have little operational authority of their own. They influence policy primarily by influencing the president.

The economists who serve with the Council of Economic Advisers can shape the president's perspective on fiscal policy, and hence his recommendations to Congress on tax and expenditure measures. Natural scientists who give advice to the president are equally influential with the chief executive in the areas of their scientific and technical competence.

The relationship between the president and his advisers at this level of administration involves reciprocal benefits: through their role as bureaucratic advisers, professionally trained economists and natural scientists obtain influence in the policy process that they would never otherwise enjoy. Most of the members of professional groups do not have the time, inclination, or capacity to win political office, and involvement in bureaucracy is, therefore, the only avenue to political power open to them.

At the same time, however, the president also derives tangible political benefits from his use of experts. The wisdom of his policy decisions is greatly enhanced in the eyes of the electorate when it appears that these decisions rest on the best professional advice the White House has been able to obtain. It has been said of the Council of Economic Advisers: "The acceptance of the Council's expertise as the President's economists increases the acceptance of his authority in matters of economic policy, and where applicable it adds economic persuasion to his strategies of influence. In return, the President provides the principal market for the Council's expertise." 13 The same point has been made on the role of natural scientists in government: "The scientists may find himself on the political firing line, placed there by a politician interested in using the scientist's prestige as an 'expert' to disarm the critics of his (the politician's) choices." 14

"There are risks as well as benefits for any political executive in his relationship with his advisers. It is, for example, highly important to a president that no one adviser be allowed to exercise monopolistic influence over his decisions. "An executive relying on a single information system became inevitably the prisoner of that system." So wrote Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in describing the elaborate system of checks and balances that Franklin D. Roosevelt maintained to prevent any adviser from becoming the Rasputin of his administration. "Roosevelt's persistent efforts... was to check and balance information acquired through a myriad of private, informal, and unorthodox channels and espionage networks." 15
The danger to which Kissinger was pointing became apparent in August, when President Nixon began to exercise greater control over decision making in the National Security Council. Kissinger, who normally kept President Nixon informed about the advice he received, was forced to report that he had been unable to make any significant progress in the negotiations over Vietnam.

One of the chief reasons why Kissinger was able to maintain his influence over President Nixon was the fact that the President had no one else to turn to for advice. Kissinger, who was well known for his ability to keep the President informed, was able to provide him with a range of options for action, along with their advantages and disadvantages. This allowed the President to make informed decisions based on the advice he received.

The President's lack of alternative sources of advice had two major consequences. First, it made him dependent on Kissinger, who was able to exert significant influence over his decisions. Second, it limited the President's ability to consider a range of options, which made him vulnerable to Kissinger's preferences.

In August, Kissinger recommended that the President should consider a broader range of alternatives, including a more confrontational approach. However, President Nixon was not convinced by this advice, and chose to continue with the strategy he had previously adopted.

The President's reliance on Kissinger had several implications. It made him vulnerable to Kissinger's influence, which was evident in the way he made decisions. It also limited the President's ability to consider a range of options, which made him vulnerable to Kissinger's preferences.

The consequences of this situation were significant. It made the President dependent on Kissinger, who was able to exert significant influence over his decisions. This made him vulnerable to Kissinger's preferences, which were often at odds with the President's own views.

In American government, as in most advisory institutions, the independence of the advisors is as important as the quality of their work. If the advisors are too close to the decision maker, they may lack the independence to provide objective advice. In the case of Kissinger, his close relationship with the President made him vulnerable to the President's preferences, which were often at odds with the interests of the country.

This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the President was not able to receive advice from independent sources. This made him dependent on Kissinger, who was able to exert significant influence over his decisions. This made him vulnerable to Kissinger's preferences, which were often at odds with the interests of the country.
George Reed argues, however, that even members of the president's own staff who generally come to the White House from the private sector may find it difficult to adapt to the unique environment of the executive branch. In his view, executive branch positions often require a different set of skills and knowledge than those acquired in the private sector. Reed suggests that the president's staff should be selected based on their ability to work effectively in the executive branch, rather than simply on their previous experience in the private sector.

Advisers' Influence

The influence of presidential advisers is a topic of ongoing debate. Some argue that a diverse group of advisers is necessary to ensure that the president is exposed to a wide range of perspectives. Others contend that too much advice can be paralyzing, especially if it comes from individuals who are not fully aligned with the president's goals.

President Kennedy's approach to advising was characterized by a series of broad decisions and a lack of detailed planning. This approach was controversial, with some critics arguing that it led to a lack of coherence and consistency in the administration's policies. Others, however, contend that this approach was necessary to ensure that the president had the latitude to pursue his vision for the country.

Despite the challenges, the role of presidential advisers remains an important one. As President Johnson's case illustrates, the ability of an administration to carry out its policies depends on the quality of the advice it receives. It is therefore essential that the president has access to a diverse and well-informed group of advisers who can help him make the best possible choices.
hegemony over Congress masks the fact that much of what ultimately comes to be regarded as the president's legislative program stems from the actions of bureaucrats in the executive establishment. Located as they are in intimate contact with the everyday processes of government, bureaucrats have an unexcelled vantage point from which to see the need for new legislation. As Lawrence Chamberlain long ago pointed out in tracing the emergence of bureaucratic legislation: "The administrative officer lives with his job. In his daily concern with the raw material of administration, at the point where the government and the public meet, he becomes keenly conscious of the inadequacies, ambiguities, and lacunae of the law he administers."

Of course, the role of executive agencies in actually originating legislation should not be exaggerated. Many bills drafted by bureaucrats have their inspiration outside of the executive branch altogether. These bills may be drawn up by executive agencies at the request of congressmen, or constituency groups may seek an agency's sponsorship of legislative proposals designed to protect or advance their interests. Moreover, outside experts may be considered or involved in the deliberations of executive agencies before new legislation is developed—as they were in the "task force" employed by President Johnson to come up with new ideas for his administration. But even when these factors are taken into account, the role of executive agencies in formulating legislation is still critical. Robert S. Gilmour cites the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which proposed "approximately 300 separate bills in the space of a single legislative year," and most of these were "initiated by the HUD bureaucracy."

Modern presidents have sometimes regarded this bill-drafting activity of executive agencies as a source of legislative leadership. This concern gave rise to the requirement that each agency clearly its recommendations with the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget — OMB) before submitting them to Congress, a procedure designed to ensure that these plans in accord with the program of the president. Since the 1960s, however, the White House staff no longer relies on OMB to protect the president's interests on major legislative proposals. Members of the staff have themselves begun to work jointly with departments that are developing legislation they regard as crucial. In the Nixon administration, this staff function was institutionalized in the Domestic Council, which was established to initiate and coordinate legislative proposals within the executive branch. During the Carter administration this function was performed by a Domestic Policy Staff. Thus, the task of monitoring legislative proposals to make certain they are in accord with the president's program continues, but that function is increasingly performed by the White House staff rather than OMB. Structures change, but the function remains constant. Of course, from the point of view of OMB, the function is no longer performed as well when it is managed by the White House staff, because the staff is a highly politicized, transient group, whereas OMB is run by a permanent bureaucracy that prides itself on serving the presidency rather than any one president.

The power that accrues to executive agencies through their control over information and the advisory process is thus reflected first by their ability to influence the policies carried on or the laws enacted by elected officials. It is also evident in their ability to influence the attitudes of the general public—to generate information that structures public opinion on major policy issues. Thus, NASA has enjoyed extraordinary success in winning public support for the nation's space programs, and the ability of the Pentagon to shape public perceptions of defense needs is legendary.

When agencies are thus successful in manipulating public opinion in their own favor, they automatically enhance the strength of their position as advisory bodies to elected officials, because politicians are much more attentive to the advice of agencies they perceive as respected by the public. Agencies may thus use their control over information to their own advantage in two ways. First, by directly influencing the attitudes of elected officials, and second, more indirectly, by creating public demands to which politicians must respond. These demands may be for new laws that will strengthen an agency's powers, or for an increase in appropriations so that an agency believes will enable it to carry out its responsibilities more effectively. If the Navy convinces the public of the need to expand the number of ships in the nation's fleet, then it will have little trouble persuading Congress to take the same view.

Power of Implementation

The expertise of bureaucratic organizations also manifests itself through control over the techniques by which policy is carried out
and upon which its success eventually depends. Elected officials may have far-reaching ambitions for new programs or policies, but the actual policy alternatives open to them in many situations are restricted to the courses of action their organizational machinery can carry out. Bureaucratic resistance or incapacity may spell the doom of even their most modest policy proposals. What a political leader can do in government mainly turns on what the bureaucratic organizations under his jurisdiction have the capacity to do. Presidents have sometimes felt that executive agencies lacked not the capacity but the will to help them achieve their policy objectives.

Consider an American president. In many ways the enormous organizational apparatus over which he presides in the executive branch is an annoying burden to the chief executive. It often drags its feet in carrying out his proposals or generates jurisdictional disputes that he must settle, in this way consuming his time and exhausting his energy. But in the end the president depends heavily upon the ability of bureaucratic organizations for his own success. Indeed, as President Johnson discovered with Vietnam, a president's orders may be disastrous for him if their execution is beyond the capabilities of his bureaucracy.

Graham Allison gives us an illuminating description of the degree to which the options open to political leaders are limited by the talents of the bureaucratic organizations under their jurisdiction:

existent organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem. ... The fact that rigid programs (equipment, men and routines that exist at the particular time) exhaust the range of buttons that leaders can push is not always perceived by these leaders. But in every case it is critical for an understanding of what is actually done.30

A telling illustration of Allison's argument was the role played by the development of a countersurgency capability in the American military apparatus. During the 1950's, one of the chief complaints leveled against the Eisenhower administration was that it lacked the organizational capacity to conduct small-scale, limited wars. Because of this deficiency, it was argued, policy makers were forced to threaten nuclear war in situations in which it was not realistic to expect other countries to believe that this threat would ever be carried out. In the view of critics, this weakness in its military arsenal deprived American foreign policy of much of its capacity to deter undesired behavior on the part of adversaries in international politics.

When John Kennedy was elected president in 1960, one of the primary items on his agenda was creating a limited war capability that would end the nation's exclusive and ineffective reliance upon the nuclear deterrent and enable it to cope with guerrilla movements that were believed to be Communist-led in the underdeveloped nations. The creation of this capability under Kennedy made it possible for President Johnson to choose in 1965 to have American forces become directly and massively involved in ground combat in South Vietnam.31 In 1964, at an earlier stage of the war in Indochina, when the United States had not yet developed such countersurgency techniques, President Eisenhower refused to permit direct American participation in the war.

This is not to say that there is any iron law dictating that a bureaucratic capability once established will inevitably be used. But certain consequences do usually follow when an administrative organization is created to provide policy makers with a desired capability. For one thing, such an organization inevitably has a vested interest in its own survival. It will thus tend to search for missions through which its value to society can be demonstrated and the flow of resources into the organization encouraged. It thus stands to benefit from policies that enable it to display its skills, and these policies acquire a weight in executive deliberations they would never otherwise possess.

Hence, a policy option that is strongly supported by an executive agency is much more likely to be adopted than one that lacks such sponsorship. Predicting which of several possible alternatives will be followed as public policy develops can in no small measure be based on assessment of the relative strength of the agencies responsible for carrying out each option under consideration. Policy makers will always be under pressure to follow courses of action that have support from strong bureaucratic organizations and to ignore those which do not. This pressure especially applies in national security affairs, where executive organizations play a large role in developing national policy.32

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The civil war in Vietnam upon military intelligence for information on suspected subversives, the intelligence operation generated a demand for its product by the government agencies. A source of the operation said, "We can't afford to have our hands tied behind our backs. We have to be able to react quickly and effectively." The operation was designed to inform the government of any signs of communist activity in the country. The operation was highly successful, providing valuable information to the government, and it was widely praised for its effectiveness. The government was grateful for the information provided by the operation and continued to support it financially. The operation continued to operate successfully for several years, providing the government with valuable information on communist activities. Its success was due to the dedication and hard work of the operation's agents, who worked tirelessly to gather information and provide it to the government. The operation was a crucial tool in the fight against communism in Vietnam.
The Skills of Bureaucracy

"discretion" means the ability of an administrator to choose among alternatives—to decide how the policies of the government should be implemented in specific cases. The range of situations in which bureaucrats exercise discretion is virtually boundless. It includes the policeman making an arrest, a regulatory agency choosing either to issue or refuse a license or permit, or a public housing official evicting a tenant family on grounds of "undesirability." These decisions may vitally affect the fortunes or even the fate of the individual citizen. The capacity of administrators to use discretion in this way for the purposes of the state is, as it has been asserted, the lifeblood of administration, its exercise may certainly affect the individual citizen. The capacity of administrators to use discretion in this way justifies Martin Shapiro's description of administrative agencies as "supplementary law-makers," functioning like courts to expand the meaning of congressional legislation through their own decisions and interpretation of statutes.49

In the traditional theory of public administration in the United States, it was assumed that the administrator's discretion extended only to decisions on means, while the actual goals of administrative action were fixed by statute or by the directives of a responsible political official. This was the celebrated distinction between policies and administration presented by such pioneers as Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow. This distinction was designed among other things to provide a rationale for insulating administrative agencies from exploitation by politicians bent on using administrative offices and powers as the spoils of victory at the polls. If bureaucrats did not shape policy, then there was no reason why administrative agencies could not be left in splendid isolation, free to make decisions on personnel, on administrative organization and procedure, to attain maximum efficiency in carrying on the business of government. As Wilson puts it—"The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative."44

This was a highly useful doctrine late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth in the United States, when public bureaucracy was an infant industry that needed a protective ideology behind which it could expand. The expansion of bureaucracy much less threatening to American democracy than it might otherwise have appeared to be. The doctrine cannot, however, be regarded as valid today when the center of power in policy making has shifted from the legislative to the executive branch and when a great many bureaucratic decisions are recognized as having very large implications for policy.

The scope of this administrative discretion is vast in all societies both in the everyday routine decisions of government agencies and in the major innovative or trend-setting decisions of public policy. These two broad types of administrative decision are categorized by Herbert Simon as programmed and nonprogrammed decisions: "Decisions are programmed to the extent that they are repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for handling them so that they don't have to be treated de novo each time they occur. . . . Decisions are non-programmed to the extent that they are novel, unstructured, and consequential."45 Philip Selznick draws a parallel distinction between "routine" and "critical" decisions.46

The policy influence of administrative discretion when it is exercised with respect to nonprogrammed decisions is clear and unmistakable: if the Federal Reserve Board abruptly changes the discount rate, or alters the reserve requirements for member banks to control inflationary pressures in a booming economy, or to stimulate investment in the face of an impending economic recession, these are major policy decisions obviously important to the society at large. When the Federal Communications Commission sets forth criteria for determining how many television stations are to be allowed in each section of the country it is obviously taking the lead in designing a national communications policy by exercising its discretionary authority. The independent regulatory agencies as a group have been assigned major responsibilities by Congress for making nonprogrammed decisions that require "a high degree of expertise, a mastery of technical detail, and continuity and stability of policy;" 47

Perhaps not quite so clearly apparent is the power inherent in the capacity of bureaucrats to exercise discretion in programmed or routine decision. In fact, however, decisions that may seem merely routine from the point of view of an administrative agency are often critical to the parties affected by these administrative determinations. An individual denied the right to practice a profession as a result of a negative judgment on his or her qualifications by a licensing board has been grievously affected by the routine exercise of discretion where the state controls entry into a profession. This penalty has been described as "professional decapitation."

Moreover, a government agency responsible for awarding defense
Excerpts from Dicussion on the Bill of Reimbursement

The Bill of Reimbursement contracts makes vital decisions for industries dependent upon these contracts for their survival. Although the decision may seem quite simple, its consequences are far-reaching. The structure of the economy is such that industries and communities are heavily dependent upon the decisions of the administrative body. Any error in these decisions could lead to substantial losses for those industries and communities.

Routine administrative decisions can have widespread effects on many communities. Local communities and private organizations, which may depend heavily upon the prosperity of some industries, are also affected by these decisions. It is important to note that the decisions made by these agencies are not always based on the best interests of the communities they serve.

The provision for review of administrative decisions is crucial. It ensures that the decisions are made in the best interests of the communities and the public at large. The provision for appeals and due process is also important. It provides a avenue for individuals to have their grievances heard and for their views to be considered.

Any decision should be made after careful consideration of all factors. The decision should be based on the best available information and should be made in the best interests of the community. The due process provisions ensure that no one is denied their rights due to the decisions of the administrative body.

The system of review and appeals provides a mechanism for correcting any errors or mistakes that may occur in the decision-making process. It is important to ensure that the review system is efficient and effective. The provision for review of administrative decisions is a fundamental right of the public. It is essential for ensuring that the decisions are democratic and just.
Excessive discretion has been the greatest flaw in the American police force. The police are given too much discretion in determining who to arrest, what charges to file, and how to proceed in a case. This has led to a lack of accountability and has given rise to allegations of police brutality and corruption. In the past, police officers have been able to exercise discretion in a way that favors the wealthy and powerful, while overlooking minor offenses committed by the poor and minority groups. This has contributed to a lack of trust in the police and has hindered the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. The police must be held accountable for their actions and be subject to the same standards of conduct as any other public official. This will require a more transparent and accountable process for disciplining and dismissing police officers who violate the law or engage in misconduct.

Studies have shown that police officers use the discretion thus given them in ways that are discriminatory and that favor the wealthy and powerful. This is because the police are given discretion in a way that allows them to make decisions that are not based on objective evidence, but rather on subjective factors such as personal bias or political considerations. This has led to a lack of consistency in the application of the law and has resulted in a system that is unfair to some segments of the population. The police must be held accountable for their actions and be subject to the same standards of conduct as any other public official. This will require a more transparent and accountable process for disciplining and dismissing police officers who violate the law or engage in misconduct.

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As many of these illustrations suggest, the use or misuse of administrative discretion is a major factor in the success or failure of police operations. The police must be held accountable for their actions and be subject to the same standards of conduct as any other public official. This will require a more transparent and accountable process for disciplining and dismissing police officers who violate the law or engage in misconduct.
Exercise of Discretion

The Virtues of Bureaucracy

situations in which they might have to make troublesome decisions
with the personal consequences of their decisions being discounted by the
possibility that their personal situations might not be affected. An error in
using discretion may have disastrous consequences for the lives of thou-
sands of people living in cities under the guidance of the planners. It is
difficult to determine the extent to which they are subject to the Federal
Civil Service Commission. The physical and emotional stress to which
they are subject when they are asked to make decisions affecting the
communities in which they live is often unsuitable for the demands
on the job. The result is that they may make decisions that are not
beneficial to the communities they serve.

As the power of the Federal Civil Service Commission has increas-
ed, the lives of thousands of people living in cities under the guidance of
the planners have been affected. The influence of the commission on the
development of urban planning has increased. In fact, the commission has
become a powerful force in the field of urban planning.

In making decisions, the commission must consider the needs of
the communities they serve. This is often a difficult task, as the
communities they serve are diverse and have different needs. The
commission must also consider the interests of the federal govern-
ment, as it is the ultimate source of funding for urban planning.

In any case, reform groups working for the enactment of regula-
tions to limit the power of the Federal Civil Service Commission
may also have an impact on the commission. Their efforts may
be successful in limiting the power of the commission and in
making it more accountable to the communities it serves.

In conclusion, the Federal Civil Service Commission plays a
significant role in urban planning. Its decisions have a major
impact on the communities they serve. Reform groups are
working to limit its power and make it more accountable to the
communities they serve. The future of urban planning depends on
the ability of the commission to make decisions that are benefi-
cial to the communities it serves.
But, as we have tried to show, there are valid grounds for believing that administrative discretion, if not as American as apple pie, is certainly compatible with our political culture and very convenient for many of the groups interested in or affected by the exercise of such discretion.

Notes


ties, see Ferris and the Public Service, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).


6. James D. Richardson, comps, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), vol. 3: 1012. For a full account of the origins of the Jacksonian attitude toward bureaucracy, see Matthew A. Cren-


15. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 522. Roosevelt, however, took a number of major steps in domestic politics, including the decision to establish TVA and the court-pack aging scheme, without using the method of excessive prior consultation that Schlesinger attributes to him as a decision-making style.

16. Sartre P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-


26. See Norman C. Thomas and Harold L. Wolman, "The Presidency and Pol-
dency and Domestic Policy Formulation," in Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Sala-


28. See Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Cen-
tral Clearinghouse," American Political Science Review 48 (September 1954): 641-671, and "Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Pro-