Crime and Support for Democracy: Revisiting Modernization Theory

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**ABSTRACT**

The authors revisit the literature on modernization theory and note that the theory posits that both increases in wealth and increases in crime rates accompany modernization. This fact is often ignored by much of the scholarship on democratization, which generally focuses on economic conditions. Using 2003 survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Latinobarometro, the authors examine how victimization and perceptions of crime influence citizens’ attitudes toward democracy. The analysis of four countries (Chile, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Malawi) show that a citizen’s perception of public safety is as an important factor as any socio-economic variable in predicting support for and satisfaction with democracy. This finding is important because the consolidation of democracy is thought to require widespread support for democracy among a country’s citizenry.
**Introduction**

Until recently, few studies, especially in the field of political science, have examined crime and its impact on society in a comparative manner (Beirne 1997; Howard, Newman, and Pridemore 2000). We argue in this paper that understanding the impact of crime in the study of comparative political development is necessary for several reasons. First, crime, crime control and criminal punishment are arguably some of the most important issues facing a society. Garland (1990) suggests that the way a society deals with crime and punishes its social deviants can tell us much about that society. The question of how to balance between freedom, equality, and order is a fundamental issue in governance and closely associated with the principles of democracy. Second, current public opinion research suggests that the issue of crime and public safety is of great concern to citizens across the globe (Quann and Hung 2002). Third, many countries that have experienced recent democratic reforms have also experienced increasing crime rates (Burianek 1998; Bergman 2006). This is especially true for the emerging democracies in Africa and Latin America, which have crime rates that are significantly higher than the global average. We contend that crime and public safety are critical factors in the consolidation of democracy in these countries; factors that has been ignored in much of the literature.

Hiskey and Bowler (2005) contend that now after the 30-year trend in democratization around the world the question of why a county is democratic or not is slowing being replaced by the question of whether democracy will be strengthened and consolidated in a particular country. The success of democratic consolidation in these emerging democracies is often linked to citizens’ support for democracy and perceptions of government performance (Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Lagos 2001; Diamond 1999; Lipset 1959). Norris (1999: 2) suggest that low levels of support for democracy may increase the risk leadership coups, ethnic conflict, extreme nationalist parties, or the erosion of political rights and liberties.

Borrowing from the political science and the criminology/sociology literature on modernization theory we argue that socio-economic conditions, as well as, crime and public safety influence citizens’ views on democracy. Lipset’s (1959) conceptualization of modernization theory posits that modernization leads to increasing wealth, leading to an increase in citizen support for democracy. We agree with this proposition, but simply argue that, as scholars such as Durkheim (1893) and Clinard and Abbot (1973) note, modernization may also lead to increases in crime and victimization. Therefore, any application of the modernization theory to democratization needs to incorporate both conditions: increasing wealth and increasing crime. Using public opinion data from the
Afrobarometer and Latinbarometer we test the hypothesis that, at the individual level, experience with crime and negative perceptions of public safety reduce support for democratic governance and increase support for non-democratic alternatives.

Crime, Democracy and Modernization Theory

To study the relationship between crime and democracy one needs to bridge or connect the two fields and the theories that inform them. This is not an easy task; even within disciplines there are “islands of research that often do not communicate well with each other” (Hastedt 2001: 215). Having said this, the study of crime and the study of democracy do share some common theoretical lenses. Modernization theory has had a long history in both comparative studies of crime and comparative studies of political development. The theory,1 in both the crime and democracy context, assumes that each nation goes through similar phases of development.

In regard to political development, modernization theory argues that democracy results from society becoming more socially and economically diverse. When a society evolves from a subsistence agriculture economy to a more modern industrial society a variety of structural and social changes occur, including, the increase in per capita incomes. This increase in wealth is coincided by increases in literacy, education, and urbanization. Citizens in these more economically (and socially) evolved nations are less willing to endure oppressive authoritarian governments and more willing to support the establishment of democratic systems (Lipset 1959).

In relationship to crime, according to modernization theory, industrialization and urbanization produce a rapid increase in the complexity of social and economic relations. Technical and industrial development reshapes economic, market and labor relations. These transformations in turn change social relations by increasing social differentiation and, potentially, increasing inequality. Industrialization and urbanization may well cause a breakdown in traditional structures and values, and an increase in social interaction, tension, and conflict. These social changes then contribute to the emergence of criminal activity (Heiland and Shelley 1992).

Merging the two conceptualizations of modernization theory produces a more nuanced understanding of the democratization process. Looking at the theory through lenses from both sociology and political science, we see that modernization not only produces increases in per capita income or GDP but it also, as Durkheim (1893) predicted, produces increases in crime and victimization. One facilitates the transition to democracy, the other, we

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1 In regards to democracy, modernization theory is attributed to Seymour Martin Lipset (1959). Durkheim's (1893) work on the division of labor is seen as the basis for the modernization theory as applied to crime.
theorize, impedes it. Traditional application or testing of the modernization theory in political science often has a myopic focus on per capita income or GDP as the most crucial factor leading to democracy (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006). In fact, Kugler and Feng describe modernization theory as positing that “economic development is a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for democratic transitions” (1999: 140).

We are not arguing that economic development is not integrally linked to democratization. In the aggregate it is difficult to dismiss the connection between economic development and democratic transition, yet at the regime level it is hard to ignore that in some countries transition to democracy can also be quickly followed by a breakdown in democratic regimes (Berhard et al. 2001). We argue here that to truly understand how modernization influences political development, especially in emerging democracies, scholars need to include other societal conditions that coincide with modernization in their analysis. Borrowing from this older tradition in modernization theory we argue that crime and victimization are important variables that need to be included in the study of democratic transitions and consolidation. An examination of the consolidation of democracy that incorporates crime in addition to income provides a much more realistic application of the modernization theory and may help explain why some countries may “slide back” to non-democratic practices.

TESTING MODERNIZATION THEORY: MACRO OR MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS?

Since its inception there has been substantial debate on how well modernization theory explains the variation in democratization across the globe (for support see Jackman 1973; Feng 1997; Epstein et al. 2006; for a critique see O'Donnell 1973; Arat 1988; Przeworski et al. 2000). Much of the research testing the modernization theory uses a macrolevel approach utilizing the nation-state at time t as the unit of analysis. Aggregate national characteristics such as per capita GDP are then used as predictors of some measure of democracy (i.e., transition to or level of democracy).

We do not dispute the usefulness of such a macrolevel approach, but rather argue that the underlying assumptions and processes of the modernization theory are in some cases inherently microlevel in nature. Lipset (1959) posits that increases in wealth and income leads to democratic transition because it affects citizens’ values and “receptivity to democratic tolerance norms (p.84).” Opening up the “black box” of modernization theory we see that per capita income doesn’t directly change political institutions, it changes citizens’ attitudes and beliefs, which in turn causes changes in citizen behavior, which then changes political rules and institutions. We make a similar
contention about crime and its effect on the democratization process. The presence of crime influences citizens’ attitudes regarding liberal democracy and its value and thus influences the likelihood of the successful consolidation of democracy.

The idea that crime and public safety influence support for political regimes has been hinted at by scholars both in and outside of a comparative context. Christensen and Per Lægreid (2002) argue that citizen support for a regime or political system depends on what they get from that system. Moraski and Reisinger (2003) suggest that for democracy to thrive a relatively large proportion of people need to believe that democracy will make their lives better and improve the prospects for their children. They conclude that democracy accompanied by misery may lead to fragile governmental institutions. This line of thinking is similar to the political economy and public choice approach where citizens are considered similar to consumers in a market and where political institutions (democratic or otherwise) are expected to produce some utility (Mitchell 1983).

We argue that such statements regarding citizen values and support for democracy seem best explored and tested using microlevel survey data. Since the underlying assumption of our hypothesized relationship between crime and democratic stability is that crime and public safety influence public attitudes then an individual level analysis seems appropriate before moving to the aggregate level.²

**Crime and the Consolidation of Democracy**

As mentioned above, many scholars contend that the strengthening of democratic norms in emerging democracies greatly depends on society’s view or "citizen evaluations" of democracy. This line of research generally examines how the economic performance of a government affects the likelihood of democracies forming or surviving (Berhard, et al, 2001; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). These studies find that strong economic performance reduces socioeconomic conflicts in society and reduces citizen discontent, thereby increasing the likelihood of a democracy enduring. We like this direction in the research because it logically links citizen evaluation of performance with democratic regime endurance. If democratic governments fail to perform they will loose support from citizens.

² It should also be noted that gathering reliable, valid, and comparable aggregate measures of crime and victimization across countries in the developing world is problematic. The International Crime Victimization Survey (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Health Organization (WHO) do compile some types of victimization rates, but the criminology literature suggests that the quality and comparability of the these figures are questionable (Neapolitan 1998; Mushanga 1992; Huang and Wellford 1989).
In this paper we make a similar argument, but focus on the connection between levels of crime and democratic survival and consolidation, rather than economic performance, which we believe has dominated much of the research on democratization. We suggest that public safety is as important an issue as economic performance. If public safety interferes with the quality of life of citizens then the survival of democracy may be threatened. In the presence of high crime, the public may prefer stability over democratic competition and elite turnover.

Very few studies have explored this contention. Alvazzi Del Frate (1998) and Goldsmith (2003) find that the populations in some developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia are quite supportive of swift and harsh punishment without judicial proceedings. These attitudes might threaten the survival of newly established democratic reforms and institutions (Rauch 2002). One opinion survey in El Salvador in 1999 did find that 55 percent of respondents stated crime (delincuencia) was a justification for a coup d'etat [Justificación para golpe de estado] (Seligson et al, 2000: 158). Perez (2003-4), using two national-wide surveys conducted in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1999, found that a sense of security in one’s neighborhood was associated with higher levels of support for the national civil police and less support for an authoritarian regime.

Similar evidence may be found in the new democracies in Eastern Europe. During the 1990s the Czech Republic saw increases in crime following the transition to democracy. One quarter of the adult population in the Czech Republic reported they were a victim of some type of crime (Burianek 1998). The public responded with demands for increased repression of criminals. Survey data showed that 88 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic felt that "the maintenance of order in the state" was the most important issue facing the nation (Burianek 1998). Such attitudes could easily threaten support and trust for police and courts and these in turn can affect attitudes on democracy itself. Gordy's (2004) discussion of criminal activity and violence in Serbia suggests that in 2003 the Serbian public's lack of faith in judicial institutions damaged the legitimacy of democratic reformers and perhaps helped lead to a vote of no confidence.

The issue of “deepening” newly emergent democracies is particularly relevant for developing areas such as Latin America and Africa where the stability of democratic institutions and regimes has been called into question and many scholars wonder if some newly established democratic reforms will be built upon to further the transition to a liberal democracy or if such reforms will be replaced with former authoritarian practices. The ability of these regimes to produce both economic security and public order and safety may be a crucial element to answering this question.
The dramatic political changes and reforms that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s have in some cases coincided with increases in crime and victimization. Africa has some of the highest rates of violent crime and victimization in the world (McIlwaine 1999). Latin American has a longer history with democratic reforms but comparable crime rates. In fact the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) found that Latin America had some of the highest rates of “contact crimes” (robbery, assault with force, and sexual assault) among the 70 countries participating in the study (Alvazzi del Frate 2002). At the same time Lagos (2001) notes that there has been a notable erosion of support for democracy in the region. We suggest that such violence and insecurity poses a direct threat to the sustainability of these democratic reforms. This argument may not be new to some. Powdthavee (2005) states that politicians around the world have been greatly concerned about crime because of the impact on the public's fear, perception of personal safety, and general happiness and quality of life. Yet Powdthavee (2005) argues that little attention has been given by scholars to the link between crime, social well-being, and quality of life.

Hypotheses

An underlying idea of democracy is that when people are dissatisfied with the performance of the government, they can oust the office holders responsible for the unsatisfactory performance via the electoral process. Thus, the legitimacy of a democracy is constantly being renewed (Huntington 1991). Poor government performance, in the short term, should not then cause people to lose faith in a democratic regime but rather in the office holders who comprise the poorly performing government. Many note, however, that the large well-spring of popular support for democratic rule that sees a democratic regime through crises is not likely to exist in the emerging democracies. As Bratton et al. (2005) observe, support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is widespread but shallow.

In addition, the raison d'être of any type of government is to provide public goods. Security is perhaps the most basic public good government is expected to supply. If the government of a country is unable to perform in this area, then it is likely and understandable that people will become disillusioned with the regime with which the government is associated.

Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that:
• On average, those who have recently had experience with crime will be less supportive of democracy than those who have not.

• There is a positive association between favorable assessments of public safety and support for democracy.

DATA, CASES SELECTION AND METHOD

The empirical analysis is based on surveys administered by the Afrobarometer project in Malawi (2003, N = 1,208) and Nigeria (2003, N = 2,428) and Chile (2003, N = 1200) and Nicaragua (2003, N = 1010). The Afrobarometer used a “clustered, stratified, multi-stage probability” sampling design in order to obtain “National probability samples that represent an accurate cross section of the voting age population” in these two countries. The Latinbarometro use a “trietapic sample, probabilistic in the first two stages and age/sex quota in the last stage” with 100% coverage in Nicaragua and 70% coverage in Chile.

Case Selection

The Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometro together contain 35 countries (18 in Africa and 17 in Latin America). A separate analysis of all cases would contain too many tables and details for a journal article length manuscript. We decided to narrow the study to four cases; two from Africa and two from Latin America. A focus on Latin America and Africa can be justified because these emerging democracies are known for their fragility. In addition, Epstein et al. (2006) argue that “partial democracies” are the most important and least understood regime type and should be made a focus in the study of democratization.

Our initial analysis began with the sub-Saharan African nation of Nigeria. Like many other African countries, Nigeria experienced a transition to democracy in the 1990s. We chose Nigeria because literature has suggested that crime is a very salient issue in this country. According to Harnischfeger (2003), “Nigeria’s police and judiciary have failed to protect its citizens and have therefore lost all credibility……The breakdown of state institutions has prompted citizens in many parts of Nigeria to resort to self-help by creating vigilante groups and

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3 The survey data for Nigeria and Malawi were downloaded from: http://www.afrobarometer.org/data.html, the survey data for Chile and Nicaragua were purchased from the Latinbarometro Corporation on 6/4/2006 from the www.latinbarometro.org.

4 http://www.afrobarometer.org/methods.html

armed militias” (2003, 23). In other words, it appears that citizens may have embraced non-democratic methods of addressing issues of crime and security in this context.

To select the other African case we used the logic of the “most different systems design” (see Przeworski and Teune 1970) and performed a cluster analysis to find a case in the Afrobarometer data that was “most different” in relation to three factors: crime, democracy and per capita GDP. The results showed Malawi had the largest Euclidean distance from Nigeria. Nigeria has a per capita GDP nearly 3 times that of Malawi, and Nigeria has a substantially higher reported victimization rate (Nigeria had the highest reported attacks of the 14 African cases and Malawi had the lowest). Both countries were given a score of 4 for political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House in 2005. The same method was used to choose two Latin American countries with the exception that Mexico was excluded from the analysis. We excluded Mexico for several reasons. Its large per capita GDP (in relation to other countries in the dataset) in conjunction with the fact that the calculation of the squared Euclidean distance is greatly influenced by variables measured in larger values (like per capita GDP) produced results that showed Mexico was the “most different” from every other Latin American case. In addition to this, its close proximity and relationship to the U.S. seemed to make it a distinctive case.

The Euclidean distance scores produced by the cluster analysis of the remaining 16 cases identified Chile and Nicaragua as the two cases that are “most different.” Both Chile and Nicaragua have modest crime rates compared to the rest of Central and South America, but differ greatly on GDP and level of democracy. Chile has a per capita GDP almost 7 times higher than Nicaragua and Chile has a score of 1 for both political rights and civil liberties while Nicaragua has a score of 3 for both.

Although the Euclidean distance scores are arguably a crude way of selecting the cases it made the selection process more systematic and less capricious. These cases will allow us to test the relationship between perceptions of crime and attitudes toward democracy in a variety of settings. There is substantial variation in per capita GDP across cases, they vary in crime rates from moderate to high levels of victimization, and levels of political freedom and civil liberties varied from the highest (score of 1) to moderate/low (score of 4).

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6 The Euclidean distance between two cases is calculated by finding the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the two cases for each of the three variables: $\sqrt{(x_i - x_j)^2 + (y_i - y_j)^2 + (z_i - z_j)^2}$

7 The score ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 is the highest level of Freedom (The U.S. has a score of 1 in both categories and Saudi Arabia has a score of 7)
Conceptualization and Operationalization

The Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometro provide a rich source of survey data and instruments that allows us to measure attitudes regarding democracy and crime in a variety ways. Below is a brief discussion of how we operationalize the concepts and constructs used in our regression models. 8

Dependent Variables

Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy

Widespread support for democracy among the citizenry and political class alike is thought to be a requisite for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset 1958; Diamond 1999). We therefore look at the effect of crime and perceptions of safety on support for democracy. We measure support for democracy with a question that asks whether respondents think that democracy is the most preferable form of government. Both the Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometro pose this question in basically the exact wording (see the appendix).

The influence of crime and perceptions of safety on satisfaction with democracy is also examined. Satisfaction with democracy is related to support for democracy, but it is a separate phenomenon. While respondents’ endorsement of democracy should reflect their support for democracy in principle, satisfaction with democracy is likely to reflect respondents’ feelings about their experiences under the new regime. Bratton et al. observe, “The former [support for democracy] tends to embody deeply held political values, while the latter reacts to the political exigencies of the day” (2005, 93). We view things a bit differently. Numerous studies have shown a disconnect between people’s stated support for civil liberties and the position they take on concrete situations at which civil liberties are at issue. That is, people are much more apt to support civil liberties in the abstract than they are in concrete situations (Prothro and Grigg 1960). Similarly, as others have noted, expressing support for democracy is the politically correct attitude in most areas of the world. However, the practical application of democratic principles to people’s concrete situations might be different. As Bratton et al. (2005) note, the relationship between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives is not that strong. Thus, expressing support for democracy does not necessarily reflect “deeply held values,” but instead reflects people’s general affection toward the ideal of democracy as a regime type. Both the Afrobarometer and the Latin barometro ask similar questions regarding satisfaction with democracy

8 Please see the appendix for the wording of the questions used for each measure.
We attempt to test the application of democratic principles by using a measure that asks respondents about concrete preferences regarding the future of democracy in their countries. In the Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked to choose between two statements. One statement was the elected government should be given more time to deal with the problems it has inherited. The other statement was that, should the present system not be able to produce results soon, other forms of government should be considered. Higher values on this variable correspond to less support for democracy.

Similarly, the Latinbarometro asked a question regarding a respondent’s agreement with the following statement, “I would not mind a non democratic government in power if it could solve the economics problems.” In Chile 15.9 percent of respondents strongly agreed and 41.5% agreed with the statement. In Nicaragua 15.5 percent strongly agreed and 64.3 percent agreed with this statement.

Independent Variables

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence

We are interested in how people’s experience and perception of safety affects their views of democracy. Both the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometro contain several questions regarding the issue of crime.

Experience with crime

In Nigeria and Malawi we use respondents’ reports of whether they or a member of their family had either been the victim of a burglary or attack over the past year. Forty percent of Nigerian respondents reported that they or a family member had been such a victim, while 26.8% of Malawians did so. In Chile and Nicaragua respondents were asked whether they have been a victim of a crime in the past 12 months. In Chile 33.8% of respondents and in Nicaragua 29.7% of respondents reported an experience with crime.

Perceptions of Crime

We measure people’s perception of the crime problem in several ways. Both surveys ask respondents whether the country is becoming safer or less safe (see appendix for wording). In addition, the Afrobarometer asks respondents how well or how badly the current government is handling the problem of crime. Similarly, the Latinbarometro ask respondents to reflect on whether the country is winning the war on crime and delinquency.
Higher values on all of these variable correspond to more positive appraisals of government performance regarding crime reduction.

Control Variables

We include several control variables including the demographic variables gender, level of poverty, and age. In addition, political awareness and engagement, identification with the party in power, and subjective assessments of satisfaction with life and the economy and government performance have been found to affect levels of support for the government. We therefore include these variables as control variables in the model.

The great similarities between the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometro allows us to, to a great extent, replicate the models for Sub-Saharan African and apply them to our Latin American cases. Some differences do remain. Partisanship was not available for the Latin American data and therefore replication of the variable RULING PARTY, which indicates a respondent that supports the ruling party, was not possible. Some wording differences in the survey questions prevent an exact replication but the similarities are remarkably consistent (See appendix).

CONCLUSION ………………………………………..
APPENDIX: QUESTION WORDING IN THE AFROBAROMETER

Dependent Variables

Attitudes toward Democracy

Support for Democracy
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
C: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.

Recoded so that the value on this variable is 1 if the response was A, and 0 otherwise.

Satisfaction with Democracy
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in ________? Are you:
0=[country] is not a democracy, 1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 4=Very satisfied.

Try Another Form of Government/More Time
Which of the following is the closest to your views? Choose Statement A or Statement B
A: Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with the inherited problems.
B: If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government.
1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B

Reject One-Party Rule
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.
1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly Approve

Independent Variables

Experience with Crime
Two variables were combined to create a dummy variable for experience with crime over the past year:

Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Had your home broken into and had something stolen?
0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Always

Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?
0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Always

If the response to either of the above questions was not never, this variable was coded as 1.

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence
We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of military rule (Nigeria)/one-party rule before 1994 (Malawi).
Please tell me if the following are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Safety from crime and violence?
1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better

Crime Performance
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Reducing crime?
Response set: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well
QUESTION WORDING IN THE LATINBAROMETER

Dependent Variables

Attitudes toward Democracy

Support for Democracy
With which of the following statements do you agree most?
   A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
   B. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
   C. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime

Recode so that the value on this variable is 1 if the response was A, and 0 otherwise.

Satisfaction with Democracy
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?

Support for Non-Democratic Government
Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements.
I would not mind a non democratic government in power if it could solve the economics problems

Independent Variables

Experience with Crime
Have you, or someone in your family, been assaulted, attacked, or been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months?
Have you or someone in your family been aware of an act of corruption in the last 12 months? Have you known if any of your friends or someone in your family has consumed drugs in the last 12 months? Have you known somebody who has bought or sold any drugs in the last 12 months?

Have you or your family been victim of a crime
   [1] Yes, [0] No

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence
Generally speaking, would you say that living in (country) is getting safer or more unsafe? Would you say its very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?

Crime Performance
People have very different opinions. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each the following statements. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree:

We are winning in the war against crime and delinquency:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description: A = Afrobarometer; L = Latinbarometro</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RULING PARTY</strong></td>
<td>Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which party or organization is that? Coded as 1 if respondent said felt close to the ruling party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **DISCUSS POLITICS** | A: For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Discussed politics with friends or neighbors. 4=Yes, often  
L: How frequently do you do each of the following things? Talk politics with friends. 1=Never, 2=Almost never, 3=Frequently, 4=Very Frequently |
| **TV-NEWS**         | How much attention did you pay to the political news on television?. 5=A lot, 4=Quite a bit, 3=Some, 2=A little, 1=None at all |
| **RADIO-NEWS**      | How often do you get news from: the radio? 5=Everyday |
| **SERVICE DELIVERY**| A: Comparing the current government with the former military government, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: Effective in service delivery? Response set: 1= Much Less, 2=Less, 3=About the Same, 4=More, 5=Much More.  
L: Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with... 
a. Health you have access to - b. Education you have access to -  
1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Rather satisfied, 4=Very satisfied [ questions were added together to form SERVICE variable] |
| **ECONOMY**         | A: In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country? Response set: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good  
L: Same for Latinbarometro |
| **QUALITY OF LIFE** | A: In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good  
L: In general, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? 1= Not satisfied at all, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 4=Very satisfied |
| **EDUCATION**       | A: How much education have you had? 9=Post-graduate  
L: How much and what type of education respondent completed. 1=Without education, 17=Completed university |
| **POVERTY**         | A: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Electricity? Cooking fuel? 4=Always (added together and then divided by 5)  
L: Does your salary and the total of your family’s salary allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? 1= Does not cover them, there are great difficulties, 2= Does not cover them, there are difficulties, 3=Covers them all right, without great difficulty, 4=Covers them well, I can save |
| **FEMALE**          | Coded by interviewer. Recoded: male (code=0) and female (code=1) |
| **AGE**             | Value corresponds to actual age of respondent |
BIBLIOGRAPHY


