Exam Topics for PHIL 310: Great Philosophers—Wittgenstein

*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

The taxonomy and constitution of reality (from objects to the world to logical space)

Features of worldly items (e.g., existence/obtaining)

Logical form (of objects, of states of affairs, of situations, of reality)

The make-up or constitution of pictures (pictorial elements with pictorial relation, plus structure)

How a picture connects to reality

Pictorial form as how a picture represents (what it has it common with) a state of affairs

Representation vs. depiction

Pictorial form being displayed rather than depicted

Pictures being correct or incorrect (true or false) by agreeing or disagreeing with reality

Sense as what a picture represents; sense as truth-conditions

The taxonomy and constitution of language (from names to elementary propositions to language)

Thought as picturing the world, as having a proposition with sense in mind

Propositions vs. propositional signs (symbols vs. signs)

Propositional signs as pictures; a proposition as given by a propositional sign with a method of projection representing situations (logical combinations of states of affairs)

Names as representatives of objects; objects as what names mean

Elementary propositions as determinate arrangements of names

Context principle for when names have meaning—only when used within propositions

Elementary propositions as representing individual states of affairs

A set of $n$ elementary propositions generating $2^n$ different ways they can be assigned a combination of truth-values—that is, $2^n$ different truth-possibilities

Complex propositions as logical combinations of elementary propositions
The complete analysis of a proposition as revealing which elementary propositions it has in which logical combination

Logical combinings of a set of elementary propositions as patterns of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of those elementary propositions—resulting in there being 2 raised to the $2^n$ of these patterns for a set of $n$ elementary propositions

A truth-table as showing a logical combination rather than representing it

A given pattern of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions getting logically combined as the truth-conditions for that logical combination

Propositions displaying (“showing”) their logical form rather than representing (“saying”) it

Difference from Frege and Russell on logic—rejecting the idea that the logical constants are names or representatives of anything; logic of language (and facts) as displayed not represented

Any logical combination of a set of elementary propositions being “reconstructible” in terms of the selective application and reapplication of a single truth-function, the $N$-operator, making the $N$-operator what is common to all logical combining—the core of the general form of the proposition

The full range of the logical combinations of a given set of elementary propositions constituting a series limited by agreement with all the truth-possibilities of those elementary propositions on one end and disagreement with all the truth-possibilities on the other

This series being the full range of truth-conditions and thus senses—everything that can be said—that can be built out of a given set of elementary propositions, bounded by tautology and contradiction at its limits

Tautologies and contradictions as senseless but not nonsense

Propositional signs that cannot be given a complete analysis into a logical combination of elementary propositions as amounting to nonsense

Logical necessity (tautology) as the only necessity

Traditional philosophy as nonsense in virtue of purporting to express substantive necessities

Recognizing attempts to express substantive necessities as an indirect means of identifying nonsense

Legitimate philosophy as an activity, not a body of doctrine—the activity of logically clarifying language to distinguish sense from nonsense

The propositions of natural science being the totality of what can be correctly said
Philosophical Investigations

Augustinean picture of language—relation to Tractatus view

Idea of language-games and their purpose

Considerations against Augustinean picture from primitive grocer and builder language-games

Ostensive teaching of words not nailing down understanding

Having a picture or rule in mind vs. applying it

Rules-regress problem for idea of meaning as an inner instruction for application

Family resemblance notions as rejection of essences or necessary and sufficient conditions

Game as a family resemblance notion; language as a family resemblance notion (no essence to language, no “general form of the proposition”)

Meaning as use—based in custom or habit of a community practice

Understanding as an activity, not a mental state or process

Incoherence of private rule following—no way for an individual on his own to distinguish seeming to follow the same rule from really following it—following a rule as blind doing

Need of a community for there to be a difference between following a rule and going against it

Rejection of Cartesian framework with its distinction between an inner realm and an outer realm

Rejection of idea of private objects or phenomena as what some of our talk—of meaning, of understanding, of sensations (of pain, of red), of perception—is about or describes

Private language requiring private rule following and thus being incoherent

Rejection of behaviorist analysis alternative for sensation-language

Grammatical fictions and grammatical illusions leading to confusions about what language-games do—leading us to take them as talking about/describing things of some sort of thing

Rejection of standard view of psychological talk as about inner thought states—taking talk of belief, intention, hope, etc. as distinct from talk about thought: belief, etc. as kinds of doing

Rejection of the sense-data plus conceptualization account of perception in virtue of its appeal to sense-data as private objects in an inner realm