The history and memory of discrimination in the domain of French nationality: The case of Jews and Algerian Muslims

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ABSTRACT

Since the Republican Regime was definitively installed in France (1875), four categories of French nationals have been subject to discrimination inscribed in nationality law: French women who married foreigners, Algerian Muslims, naturalized citizens and Jews. Although the Republic recognized them as French, they did not always have rights equal to other French nationals. Today such discrimination has disappeared, yet two of these groups—the Jews and the Algerian Muslims—preserve the trace, the memory, the suffering and the lived experience of past discrimination, despite re-establishment of their rights and sometimes recognition or reparation for their loss. This article attempts to understand why. In these two cases, a second event—the discourse of de Gaulle in 1967 and the reform of nationality laws in 1993—reactivated the painful past and provoked disidentification. This second event occurred during a time of formal equality of rights, and yet harked back to the time of discrimination.

Introduction

On March 8, 1872, a few weeks before his death, Francis Lieber, professor at Columbia University in New York, wrote to his best friend, Charles Sumner, Massachusetts senator, leader of the Senate’s radical Republicans and fervent abolitionist (Donald, 1970), as

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1 A first draft of this article was presented at a conference at Princeton University on “The New Cleavages in France” (October 9-12, 2003), organized by the Princeton University Program in European Politics and Society and by the Institut d’études politiques de Paris.
he had done almost every week for 37 years. A Prussian refugee in the United States in 1827, Francis Lieber founded the systematic study of governments, that is, American political science.\(^2\) Moreover, he occupied the first chair dedicated to this discipline at Columbia University in 1858 (Crick, 1959:15-18). Francis Lieber was Charles Sumner’s best friend, which is not to say that the two men were always in agreement. Sumner had long been a Francophile, while Lieber rediscovered a pride in his origins and rejoiced in the victory of Bismarck’s Prussia against Napoleon III’s France in the war of 1870-1871. On this occasion, he held public meetings in support of Germany in New York’s Central Park, gathering together Americans of German origin. Here, then, is what Lieber wrote to his friend Sumner some months after Prussia’s victory and the foundation of the German Empire:

> I have received this day, from Berlin, a call to collect money among the Germans in America for a Bismarck Foundation in the University of Strasburg! I shall send some money and be done with, I suppose.

> The Germ. Government is evidently bent on making Strasbourg a first rate university, which means something. The French neglected it shamefully. But they neglected and neglect everything except Paris. And here again I come to my old question: What is it that makes the French the only people who can convert conquered people? They receive no benefit from France. Yet they speak for France. Germans, English, Americans, none can do it. What is it?

> Ever Yours
> F.L.
> (Charles Sumner papers, microfilms, box 84, letter of March 8, 1872, Library of Congress).

In my book *Qu’est ce qu’un Français* (Weil, 2002), I propose the hypothesis that Sumner had, in a certain manner, already responded to this question in fighting throughout the 1860s for the introduction into the American Constitution of the phrase: “all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave.” According to his biographer, the American historian David Donald, Sumner had taken the phrase “equal before the law” (*égal devant la loi*) from the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and he wanted to be the first to introduce it into the American Constitution and jurisprudence (Donald, 1970:149). When he proposed this amendment

\(^2\) Legal scholar and professor of political economy at the University of South Carolina (1835-1856), at Columbia College (1857-1865) and at Columbia Law School (1865-1872), Francis Lieber notably wrote what became in 1863 the first “legal code of war” (Freidel, 1947).
to the American Senate, his colleague Senator Howard begged him “to dismiss all reference to French constitutions or French codes and go back to the good old Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers in the (Northwest) ordinance of 1787” (Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st session, pp. 1488-1489, cited in Donald, 1970:151). Sumner thought that his conservative colleagues opposed the amendment because the concept of equality did not come from England, “for the idea itself finds little favor in that hierarchical kingdom” (cited in Donald, 1970:149).³ The principle of equality was at the heart of the French Revolution, but it was not any more foreign to the former kingdom of France. David Hume had already suggested in 1777 that one of the reasons for the success of absolutist governments was the lack of difference between former and new subjects: “Compare the pais conquis of France with Ireland and you will be convinced of this”⁴.

The French of Strasbourg were equal to the French of Paris, which explains the former’s attachment to France. By contrast, the Germans of Strasbourg were inferior to the Prussians or Germans of Berlin (Blackbourn, 1997:261-262), in much the same way as the Scots or the Irish were inferior to the English. This concept of equality–between territories under the Ancien Régime and between individuals since the Revolution–is therefore at the heart of this success questioned by Francis Lieber.

One can thus put forward the inverse hypothesis that legal inequalities endured by French citizens can explain the absence of identification with France and phenomena of disidentification. The sphere of nationality offers interesting examples to verify this hypothesis. Since the Republic was definitively established in 1875, four categories of French nationals have been subject to discrimination inscribed in nationality law: women, Algerian Muslims, naturalized citizens and Jews. The Republic recognized them as French and yet they did not always have rights equal to other French nationals (Weil, 2000: Chs. 4,8).

Today such discrimination has disappeared. Yet, some of these four groups and their descendents preserve the trace, the memory, the suffering and the lived experience of past discrimination, in spite of the re-establishment of their rights and sometimes the recognition or the reparation of their loss. We are going to try to understand why.

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³ Sumner nevertheless thought that this concept formed a part of the American tradition in that it gave “precision to that idea of human rights which is enunciated in our Declaration of Independence” (1864:14-15, cited in Donald, 1970:149).

⁴ He added: “When a monarch extends his dominion by conquest, he soon learns to consider his old and new subjects on the same footing; because, in reality, all his subjects are to him the same.... The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states” (Hume, 1963 (c1777):298-299, cited in Sahlins, 1989:113).
Four categories of discrimination

The first part of the French Civil Code published in 1803 established (paternal) descent, later called *jus sanguinis*, as the exclusive path for transmitting French nationality at birth. This constituted a break with a strong tradition of *jus soli*, attributing nationality by birth in the territory that prevailed in the French Kingdom and after the Revolution until 1803 (Weil, 2000: Ch. 1). At the same time, French women who married foreigners were obliged to assume the nationality of their husbands; they lost their French nationality and were immediately reduced to the status of a foreigner in France. This affected hundreds of women each year in the course of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the immigration of men increased, and especially after World War I, when it became massive, almost 200,000 women born French became foreign through their marriage to a foreign immigrant (see the statistical tables of Depoid, 1942:59-61). Close to 150,000 women born French were foreign at the time of the census of March, 7, 1926, constituting about 6.5% of the foreign population and 15% of foreign women. Once the marriage was pronounced, the wife changed nationality. Now foreign, she had to immediately register with police authorities in order to obtain a foreign identity card. She lost her employment if she was a civil servant, and, subject to the national law of her husband, she could lose the right to divorce (if she married, for example, an Italian, as Italian law forbade divorce). Finally, she could be forced to leave France in order to accompany her spouse, to whom she owed obedience. The situation was sometimes terrible: on October 2, 1919, the Minister of the Interior ordered mayors to request from any Chinese man wishing to marry a Frenchwoman “a certificate testifying that he does not have a legitimate wife.” He had been informed by the French Embassy in China that several women, taken there by their husbands who had come to work in France during World War I, discovered that their spouse already had a lawful Chinese wife. Such intolerable situations brought about the convergent mobilization of populationists and feminists and modification of the legislation in 1927.

In 1889 the return of the *jus soli* marked the second stage in the construction of modern French nationality law. According to the law of June 26, 1889, a child born in

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5 The difference from the figure of 200,000 is explained by the fact that, during the same period, 29,738 women became French once again, most often at the moment of the naturalization of their husbands or after their spouse's death, a separation or a divorce (Depoid, 1942:35). A certain number of women married to a foreigner also left France with their husbands.

6 Over one million (1,004,522) women were counted as foreigners, of which 471,983 were married (Statistique générale de la France, 1931).

7 This obligation to register dates only after 1917, since the law of 1893 did not apply to a French woman who became foreign by marriage (Despagnet, 1904:93).
France to a parent already born in France is French at birth. If the foreign parents were born in another country, the child becomes French when he or she reaches majority, except in the case of renunciation in the year that follows. This law applies in Algeria. Following the Jews of Algeria, who had already been made fully French by the Crémieux decree of October 24, 1870, children of foreign settlers were thus given French nationality. The Muslims of Algeria remained separate from this process of integration. Formally they were French, but it was a denatured nationality: to become fully French they had to undergo a procedure of individual naturalization instituted by a senatus-consultum of 1865, as did Jews and foreigners. Between 1865 and 1962, less than 7,000 Algerian Muslims became fully French either through the senatus-consultum of 1865 or through another procedure instituted in 1919.

The most popular reason invoked to explain this very small number was the desire of a very large majority of Algerian Muslims to keep their personal status dictated by the Koran. Beyond the fact that numerous Muslims were dissuaded by the colonial administration from applying for naturalization, the simple renunciation of one’s personal status as Muslim (that is, renouncing those customs incompatible with the Civil Code) did not suffice to gain full nationality, as is evinced by the Muslim converts to Catholicism studied by André Bonnichon (1931). In the 1920s, these numbered, according to his calculations, between several hundred and some thousands. The majority was naturalized, but not all, for reasons sometimes related to age—those under the age of 21 were not yet eligible for naturalization. In this case, the non-naturalized convert was considered to remain an indigenous Muslim subject to repressive indigenous tribunals, as well as to the tribunal of the cadi where it existed. To justify this rule, Algiers’s Court of Appeal declared in 1903 that the term “Muslim” “does not have a purely confessional meaning, but that it on the contrary designates the group of individuals of Muslim origin who, having not been admitted into full citizenry, have necessarily preserved their personal status of Muslim, without the need to distinguish whether they belong or not to the Mahometan religion” (Algiers, Nov. 5, 1903, R.A., 1904.2.25). This assignation of ethnic or religious origin—which kept the converted Muslim in the status of “indigenous” as long as he was not the subject of naturalization, that is, of an individual and personal decision of the public authority—shows the ethno-political, and not simply civil or religious, character of the status of the indigenous Muslim in Algeria.

Held back from full nationality, Muslims were subject to the Indigenous Code: they were sanctioned if they gathered or left their village without authorization, or if their claims to the administration were too strong. After World War II, this code was revoked,

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8Bonnichon (1931:12) evaluates this figure at 700 in Kabylie and mentions the presence of a certain number among them in mainland France. Bastier (1990) cites a figure of 2,000 in 1910.
but the majority of Muslims, owing to their personal status, voted in a separate electoral college. It was only in 1962, following independence, that they acquired a full nationality—either Algerian or, for a minority among those residing in France, French.

Finally, the law of August 10, 1927, is the third and last stage of the construction of French nationality law, which opened up naturalization. Consequently, naturalization came to require three years of residence in France instead of ten. The intent was to naturalize 100,000 foreigners per year. Together with this opening up, however, naturalized citizens became subject—between 1927 and 1984—to greater electoral and professional restrictions. The law of 1927 extended the ineligibility for parliamentary mandates for ten years, instituted in 1889, to all elected offices and mandates—not only political, but also professional. In addition to the inability to be elected, the law of July 19, 1934, restricted naturalized citizens from becoming public servants, being admitted to the Bar, or holding a ministerial office, again for a period of ten years (Bonnet, 1976:283-285). The decree of November 12, 1938, added a ban from voting for five years. The ordinance of 1945 maintained this voting ban, as well as the ten-year electoral ineligibility, but reduced the delay in access to public offices and to the Bar from ten to five years. The law of April 28, 1952, instituted a delay of five years for the holding of communal offices. It was only on July 17, 1978, that Parliament adopted a law lifting the employment restrictions and the ban against voting. The ineligibility to seek electoral mandate for ten years after naturalization remained until the laws of December 8 and 20, 1983.

Concerning women, Algerians and naturalized citizens, this discrimination was a quasi-structural element of regression at each stage of “progress” in the history of French nationality law. For Jews, it was the Vichy regime that revoked their equality of rights. From July 1940, nationality was a priority of the new regime. Even if they were not explicitly named in the “laws” of July 22 and 23, 1940, which permitted the revision of naturalization performed after the 1927 law and the stripping of nationality from French citizens who had left for other countries, Jews were the target of this new legislation. In addition, some weeks later, the law of October 7, 1940, repealed the Crémieux decree which had in 1870 naturalized all the Jews of Algeria, and thus 110,000 Algerian Jews were reduced from the status of citizen to the state of subject.

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9 Naturalized citizens who performed their military service in the active army benefited from a general exception.

10 A law of April 1933 limited, moreover, the practice of medicine solely to French citizens and to ex-citizens of countries placed under the protectorate of France, on the condition that their doctorate in medicine had been obtained in France. When a demand for naturalization was made by a doctor (or dental surgeon, as well as by a medical or dental student), it had to be examined by the Minister of Health and by the local union of doctors or dentists, who most often gave an unfavorable opinion (Estournet, 1937:85).
To identify the Jews, the commission that was set up to revise naturalizations re-examined, between 1940 and 1944, all the files of naturalized French citizens since 1927, a total of 666,594.11 When a person was suspected of being a Jew, via his or her name or birth certificate, the commission ordered an investigation at the prefecture. Parallel to this top-down procedure targeting Jews, certain dossiers followed a bottom-up path. As of August 10, 1940, the Minister of the Interior demanded that the prefects bring to his attention any cases of naturalized citizens having committed offenses or crimes, or having expressed opinions or engaged in activities contrary to the national interest. These two procedures reflect two different forms of logic at work: the great majority of Jews were denaturalized unless they represented a “national interest” for France, were prisoners of war, or were dead. Non-Jews were denaturalized only if they had committed acts or held opinions that made them appear to be bad elements in the nation. Out of 15,154 denaturalizations, about 7,000 were Jews.

Free France’s annulment of the law of July 23, 1940, which had been used to remove French nationality from French citizens who had left France since June 1940–including de Gaulle and Giraud–took place through a ceremonial act on April 18, 1943, but Algerian Jews did not regain their French citizenship for another six months. From the time of the Allied landing in November 1942 and the seizing of the Administration of North Africa, the anti-Semitic legislation instituted by Vichy, more severe in Algeria than in mainland France, had been maintained by Admiral Darlan and then by General Giraud.12 On March 14, 1943, when General Giraud declared void the constitutional acts, laws, and decrees prior to the date of June 22, 1940, he once more, through a specific Act, reestablished the abolition of the Crémieux decree,13 provoking strong reactions in the American press, on the Gaullist French national committee and among Algerian Jews. Finally, on October 21, 1943, Algerian Jews regained their full citizenship by a declaration of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN) “that the Crémieux decree is now active” (see Ansky, 1950:318-319).

It was only much later, by the Act of May 24, 1944, that the law of July 22, 1940, “relating to the revision of naturalizations,” was repealed. If General Giraud, in his edict of March 14, 1943, had annulled the acts of Vichy prior to July 22 1940, it is likely that he did not wish to annul the denaturalizations performed in the application

11 Statistics produced by the Head of Naturalizations Service at the Commission of Instruction, Archives Nationales, 3W46. I have examined 3,000 dossiers of persons naturalized between 1927 and 1940–all had been processed by the commission.
12 Giraud reiterated that the Jews were “responsible for the defeat” and that the racial laws were “one of the essential conditions of the armistice” (Marrus and Paxton, 1995:191-197).
13 All of these edicts can be viewed on the CD-ROM (2000), La persécution des juifs de France 1940-1944 et le rétablissement de la légalité républicaine Recueil des textes officiels 1940-1999, La Documentation française.
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of that very law. More surprisingly, on September 9, 1943, François de Menthon, a supporter of the Resistance from the beginning, and recently named Commissioner of Justice of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale, wrote to René Cassin, president of the Legal Committee of Free France,\(^\text{14}\) on the subject of the law of July 22, 1940, that had permitted Vichy to revise the naturalizations granted since 1927: “I envisage the preservation of this new institution” (emphasis mine). In this letter to Cassin, Menthon explains that

> the excessive number of naturalizations of dubious Jewish elements, in the years that immediately preceded the war, has given pretext to an anti-Semitism that can pose a certain problem at the time of return. Annulling a priori all measures of retraction which have taken place would not in advance overcome this problem (Conseil d’Etat, Legal Committee archives).

It was only following a strong reaction from the Legal Committee of Free France, which had to intervene twice because Menthon maintained his position for so long, that the CFLN annulled the Vichy law on denaturalizations and restored the French nationality of the denaturalized.

**Women and naturalized citizens: Effaced traces**

The four categories of discrimination left very different traces on the French directly affected and their descendents. First of all, for women and naturalized citizens, a collective memory of discrimination does not exist.

Whereas the history of the declassification of women who lost their nationality in marrying a foreigner\(^\text{15}\) has been the subject of several published works in the United States (e.g., Bredbenner, 1998), in France, it is sometimes not even mentioned in the best known women’s histories. And yet, the personal trauma, in the sense of a “state which arises when one falls into a dangerous situation without being prepared for it” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1997:288),\(^\text{16}\) must have been considerable: in marrying a foreigner, the French woman changed her nationality, often unknowingly. The information regarding this automatic consequence of marriage formed no part of the

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\(^{14}\)Created by decree on August 6, 1943, according to the model of the Council of State, the function of the Legal Committee was to give legal advice on drafted edicts and more generally on all of the legislation coming from the CFLN.

\(^{15}\)On this loss of rights that concerns all Western countries, see Weil (Forthcoming b).

\(^{16}\)The word “trauma” (traumatisme) first appeared in the French language in 1855, according to Bloch and Von Wartburg (1975).
prescribed formalities at the moment of its celebration. The mayor (article 75 of the Civil Code) read the portions relating to the status of the future husband and wife, asked them if they had a marriage contract, and then accepted their declaration of reciprocal engagement. That was all! The marriage pronounced, the woman thus lost, in addition to her nationality, her occupation as a state employee, her right to divorce and the like.

This personal trauma, which probably profoundly affected the 200,000 women concerned during the 1920s, disappeared from collective memory. These women were isolated from each other, and difficult to mobilize. The French feminist movements had as their primary objective the right to vote, of which all French women were deprived, and the equality of married men and women. Ultimately, when the loss of French nationality took on massive proportions, the law of 1927 allowed any French women marrying foreigners in the future to keep their nationality and offered those who had already lost it the possibility of recovering it.

For many naturalized citizens, the restrictions in force between 1927 and 1984 sometimes banned or delayed their access to certain occupations. From this point of view, they had important consequences. But these restrictions were temporary, lasting five or ten years. The status of naturalized citizen, while inferior, was better protected than that of foreigner. Eventually, these handicaps automatically disappeared with the lifting of these delays, and the naturalized individual could enjoy equality of rights.

The Jews: A “traumatic neurosis”?

Unlike the case of women and naturalized citizens, for the Jews and Algerian Muslims, and for their descendants, the trauma and stigma endured under Vichy, on the one hand, and across the whole period of colonization, on the other, survived the reinstitution or attribution of equality of rights in conditions that today sometimes provoke incomprehension from other French citizens. For the Jews, the politics of nationality were part of the collection of persecutionary measures put into place between 1940 and 1944. These measures directly affected a large majority of the 440,000 Jews in France: the entirety of the 140,000 foreigners, the 111,000 Jews of Algeria and the 55,000 Jews who had become “naturalized citizens” (regardless of the specific procedures of naturalization) since 1927.

17 An interesting example is that of Stanley Hoffmann, professor of political science at Harvard University. An Austrian Jew, he arrived in France with his mother in 1930, completed his education in French institutions, survived the war and became French in 1947. Unable to take the entry examination of the ENA before 1952, he decided to study a doctorate in law, taking courses at Harvard University, where he settled permanently at the end of the 1950s upon becoming a professor (Hoffmann, 1993).
The politics of nationality is inscribed at the center of a double historiographical debate: that of the place of racial politics in the general politics of the Vichy government, and that of the autonomy of the politics of Vichy in relation to Nazi demands. I tend to think that racial politics was at the heart of the Vichy regime. Its development began in July 1940 both in mainland France and, as Eric Jennings (2002) demonstrates, in the colonies, where Nazi pressure was weak. These were part of a general project of the nation’s “regeneration.” Racial politics did not distinguish between anti-Semitic laws and xenophobic laws; they were interwoven, as is confirmed in a letter that François Rochat, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, addressed to the Minister of Justice in 1941:

Our government has, since the armistice, a racial politics. On the one hand, a commission belonging to your Chancellery is carrying out the revision of naturalizations too easily granted; on the other hand, a recent legislation to a very large extent forces the Jews out of the French economy (Weil, 2000:99).

The politics of nationality cannot therefore be isolated from the whole of the racial politics, first and foremost anti-Semitic, at the core of the Vichy regime. The politics of denaturalization also allows us to understand the “autonomy” of Vichy in relation to Nazi demands. The Law of July 22, 1940, replicated a Nazi law of July 14, 1933 (Weil, 2000:129-130), of which several figures of the French extreme Right and some immigration specialists demanded the adoption at the end of the 1930s. In its application the commission did not denaturalize 100% of the Jews whose situation was examined, but “only” 78%, even going so far as to re-naturalize some Jews. But, if in July 1943, Pétain and Laval refused, under pressure from the Vatican, to guarantee

18 The targeting of naturalization of the Jews, on the one hand, and of naturalized citizens having committed various crimes and offenses, on the other, was directly inspired by the edict of application of the law of July 14, 1933. Dated July 26, 1933, the latter specifies:

the following will be thus the first to be examined in view of a revocation of their naturalization:
a) Jews of the East, except if they fought on the front during the First World War or if they have acquired special merits with regard to German interests.
b) Persons who have committed a serious offense or crime or who have conducted themselves in a manner dangerous to the health of the State and of the people.

19 In June 1936, Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, future General Commissioner for Jewish Questions under Vichy, proposed the annulment of all naturalizations granted since the armistice of 1918 (Joly, 2002). In a hearing before the High Committee of the Population in February 1939, Georges Mauco asked for “A serious review of the naturalizations granted over the last twenty years” (Weil, 2000:93).

the denaturalization of all Jews, which resulted in the Nazi denunciation (on August 19, 1943) of the distinction between foreign and French Jews reputed to protect the latter from deportation, the rate of denaturalizations did not diminish. In a letter dated September 8, 1943, Georges Dayras, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, drew up an inventory containing statistical estimates of the number of Jews whose dossiers had been examined or were being examined by the commission of revision. He found that the number of naturalizations of Jews between 1927 and 1940 totaled 23,640, of which 9,039 had already passed before the commission, 7,055 had received the decision of removal, and 14,601 were still to be decided (Archives Nationales, F60/1485, letter from Dayras to de Brinon, September 8, 1943). From that point, the rhythm of decision accelerated, and the commission of denaturalizations continued its work relentlessly and with zeal until July 1944. The commission was awaiting the results of investigations of thousands of presumed Jews whose status had not yet been determined, and it intended to undertake the review of French nationality acquisitions by the French-born children of foreign Jews, when the Liberation interrupted its work.

If the centrality of the racial and anti-Semitic politics and its inscription into the politics of nationality well after August 1943 are accepted, would this call into question what Henry Rousso—alone and then with Eric Conan—has described as a “Vichy obsession”? In an attempt to understand the relation of the French in general, and Jews in particular, to the Vichy past, Henry Rousso in *Le Syndrome de Vichy* (1990) borrowed concepts from psychoanalysis. Organizing his account of history around traumatic neurosis, which Freud saw as the determining factor in the terrified “state which arises when one falls into a dangerous situation without being prepared for it” (see Laplanche and Pontalis, 1997:288), Rousso perceives French history from the Liberation until today as starting with a work of mourning, followed by a time of repression provoking a return of the repressed, before the present phase that he describes as “obsessional” (see Dosse, 2002:76).

Later, in 1994, in *Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas*, Henry Rousso denounces with Eric Conan what “for some years has marked the triumph of anachronism” (1994:268). We know more and more, the Vichy archives are increasingly open, hundreds of boxes await study by researchers—and yet they are denounced as kept secret or inaccessible. We demand and succeed in commemorating more and more, but not always coherently, often confusing Nazi and Vichy persecution and neglecting the internal Resistance. Finally, we organize the confusion of representations around a “judeocentrism” (Rousso and Conan, 1994:269), which comes from seeing in Vichy only the persecution of Jews. Conan and Rousso appeal to the necessity of “understanding and more still of accepting. Not to resign oneself, but to accept this past, and perhaps more still the manner in which it has been handled after the war by the generation who endured it” (1994:285).

In other cases of persecuted national minorities, as, for example, the Armenians,
history remains contested. For the African-American community in the United States, reparation has not been made. In other cases still, the absence of recognition of the persecution by the nation contributes to ongoing resentment in the group’s consciousness. In contrast, for the Jews of France persecuted by Vichy, all three have taken place: the history of the persecutions has been and continues to be written; they have been recognized by the national community through acts symbolizing repentance or commemoration; and, based on a work of historical reconstruction, reparative justice has–again recently–worked under the auspices of the Mattéoli mission and the creation of the Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah (Holocaust). In the domain of nationality itself, after the annulment of the Vichy laws, the French Jews who had sought refuge in the United States during the war or in Israel after it and who lost their French nationality upon becoming American or Israeli, have been able to regain it (Weil, Forthcoming a). And for the future, as Erik Bleich (2003, esp. Ch. 5) has shown, the French anti-racism legislation structured by the law of 1972 was directly inspired by the struggle against anti-Semitism and the memory of Nazi persecution. But knowledge, recognition, restitution and reparation seem to have provoked neither forgetting nor forgiving.

The production of testimonies or of individual histories cannot be described as obsessional. If many Jews from France and Algeria return to the endured trauma in different ways—in a manner intellectual (see Derrida, 1996:32-37) and/or narrative—it is important to note that to recount or to write contribute to knowledge and recognition and allow the creation of a kind of distance. These testimonies can concern those who directly endured the persecution, as well as their children, for trauma has the characteristic of often transmitting itself across generations (e.g., Zajde, 1993). Alain Finkielkraut seems to forget this, when he ironically takes the suffering of the “second generation,” using himself as an example: “Others had suffered, and because I was their descendant I received all the moral benefits of this. […] Lineage made me the concessionary of genocide, its witness and virtually its victim” (1980:18-19). Yet, the

21 On the demand for “reparation” as a demand for recognition more than for compensation of African Americans, see, e.g., Marable (2002); on the calculation of an eventual financial compensation, see Conley (2003).
22 On this question, studied comparatively, see, e.g., Torpey (2003).
23 On this subject, Claire Synodinou writes: “Commemorative repetition represents, at a fundamental level, an equivalent of the repetition of the traumatic scene, proposed by the social in the sense of an attempt by the ego to master that which had been lived passively through the fantasmatic transmission accomplished between generations” (2000:154).
25 As distinct from punitive or rehabilitative justice, reparative justice gives a central place to the victims (Cario, 2002).
imagined violence, endured by the succeeding generations to whom the trauma is “transmitted,” can be more frightening still than the lived experience of those who were attacked.  

The multiplicity of testimonies of the persecuted themselves can be as much the sign of a process of healing as it is of a will to remember and to pass on. For Michael Pollak, the use of autobiographic writing “to overcome the trauma” motivates “almost all the accounts” “and more and more explicitly after 1956… to become the principal, indeed exclusive reason for publication” (2000:206). Jane Altounian (2000), in the case of the Armenian genocide, shows the vital necessity of the writing of trauma for the descendants of genocide survivors. It permits the inscription into a genealogy, the filling in of the lacuna of speaking, absent in the parental relations, the construction of a mediation between the traumatizing object and the persecuted generations, and finally the creation of a triangular relation between the self, one’s ancestors, and the world. When the link between generations has been broken by violence, one must spell out this rupture, this exile, such that it be contemplated, transmitting to the world that which could not be said, such that each one’s place is determined in this fragmentation.  

By contrast, “obsessional” neurotic behavior is the belief, the certainty many times reaffirmed, that there still things being hidden: concerning Vichy, the role of the Administration in the persecution of the Jews is often cited, leading to the claim that “official” historians participate in this enterprise of continuous camouflage. Thus, the paradox underlined by Conan and Rousso: “The more knowledge progresses, the more one speaks of taboos” (1994:268).  

Careful to avoid any methodological contestation, Rousso indicates that the

26 “That which is traumatizing is not the event as such, but the affects and representations, including the fantasies, that it mobilizes” (Brette, 2002:1774-1775).  
27 Altounian demonstrates very well how much, in her case, the publication of a work which contained the testimony of her father “can be considered as the putting in perspective, the putting into text–a text holding the place of sepulture in the coming-after [après-coup] of another generation and of another culture–of a collective and individual trauma” (2000:10). Boris Cyrulnik argues that it is the possibility of finding someone to whom to address the account of one’s sufferings which permits to weave the link of speech and to provoke a rehandling of emotion. The suffering is endured in a different manner, and the emotion of the trauma is no longer in the secret of memory, from the instant when an account can be addressed (1999:95).  
28 Concerning the relations between history and psychoanalysis, Michel de Certeau, for example, guards against the use of one discipline by the other: A certain number of works, in ethnology as well as in history, show that the use of psychoanalytic concepts risks becoming a new rhetoric. They thereby transform themselves into figures of style. The recourse to the death of the father, to Oedipus or to transference will work for anything. It is not difficult to inject these Freudian “concepts” supposedly usable for all ends into the obscure regions of history… They circumscribe the inexplicable; they do not explain it. They avow an ignorance. One places them there where an economic or sociological explanation leaves a remainder (1975:341).
“borrowings from psychoanalysis” in *Le Syndrome de Vichy* have “only metaphorical, not explanatory value” (1990:19). Without wanting to enter further into the question of the extension of the psychoanalytic method—adapted from the interpretation of individual to collective phenomena,—I at least agree with Paul Ricœur that “The justification for employment of the psychoanalytic ‘metaphors’ of neurosis and obsession finds its heuristic fruitfulness in its hermeneutic effectiveness” (2000:582). The question I would like to pose, however, is: if obsession is the right diagnosis “metaphorically,” were adequate interpretative conclusions drawn from it?

Evoking obsession, Freud speaks of the association of an emotional state with an idea which is not the idea related to the ætiology of the obsession, but is one what replaces it, a substitute for it … The replaced ideas all have common attributes; they correspond to really distressing experiences in the subject’s [sexual] life which he is trying to forget. He succeeds merely in replacing the incompatible idea by another ill-adapted for being associated with the emotional state, which for its part remains unchanged. It is this *mésalliance* [elsewhere Freud uses the term “false connection”] between the emotional state and the associated idea that accounts for the absurdity so characteristic of obsessions (Freud, 1893-1899: Vol. 3, pp. 74-75).

What Freud means here is that the object of the obsession is not the real object, truly painful, that the individual strives to forget. If the French Jews suffer individually or collectively from a neurosis which makes them obsess over Vichy, Vichy would not be the true cause of the problem. In the case of individual obsessional neuroses, there is thus no healing without rediscovery of the irreconcilable idea or event. In the collective situation that concerns us, there would therefore be no point in calling to forget Vichy and “to accept this past” (Conan and Rousso, 1994:285), since the problem provoking the neurosis would be different. It would instead be a question of discovering what that is.

What could be this cause, this painful moment in the lives of French Jews, that they have tried so hard to forget? My hypothesis is that this moment-object, the real cause of the obsession, is the shock felt on November 27, 1967, some months after the Six Day War in June between Israel and its Arab neighbors, upon hearing the words of General de Gaulle. That day, de Gaulle declared in a press conference:

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29 He reaffirms his metaphorical use of psychoanalysis in an important article (Rousso, 2002).
31 On the use of psychoanalytic theories in history, see, e.g., Saul Friedländer (1975) and Peter Gay (1985).
certain people even fear that the Jews, previously dispersed, who had remained what they had been for all time, an elite people, sure of themselves and dominating, have now come, once reassembled on the site of their former greatness, to change in ardent and conquering ambition the very moving dreams that they formed over nineteen centuries.32

This declaration provoked intense emotion among the Jews of France. In contrast to the war of 1956, condemned by many Jewish intellectuals (e.g., Pierre Vidal-Naquet), the Six Day War inspired a wave of solidarity among all the Jews of France, in fact among the Jews of the whole world. Annette Wieviorka recalls that “during the period of waiting prior to the Israeli victory, the anguish which had seized the Israeli population” had been experienced according to the “genocidal” mode and with an intensity almost identical by all the Jews of France: “Together the Jews of France felt things in an identical manner, whatever their implication in the communitarian institutions” (Wieviorka, 2002:137).33

The naval blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba and the concentration of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies at the frontiers of the State of Israel provoked fear of a destruction, recalling another destruction. Raymond Aron, “moreover little inclined towards intimate outpourings” (Wieviorka, 2002:137), wrote on June 4, on the eve of the war:

Arise in us an irresistible feeling of solidarity. It does not matter from where it comes. If the great powers, according to the cold calculation of their interests, allow the destruction of the small State of Israel which is not mine, this crime modest at the world-level would take away from me the will to live (Aron, 1968:70).

Some months later de Gaulle’s declarations provoked a profound shock amongst the Jews of France. Raymond Aron wrote some days later:

I challenge any man of good faith to contradict me, General de Gaulle could not but foresee the passionate reactions that he provoked, more exactly that he aroused. No man of State had spoken of Jews in this style, had characterized them as a “people” with two adjectives. This style, these adjectives, we all know them, they belong to Drumont, to Maurras (1968:17).

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33 In the course of a roundtable organized by Esprit, Wladimir Rabi spoke of “the impossibility of conceiving a second Auschwitz in the course of the same generation” (Roundtable, 1968:583).
Pierre Vidal-Naquet pointed out: “When I heard them, my reaction was immediate and I recalled—moreover I was not alone in doing so—the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, insofar as the word ‘dominating’ notably … evoked a classic theme of anti-Semitism, that is the idea of a Jewish conspiracy” (Roundtable, 1968:583).34

The Six Day War represents a turning point in the history of the Jews in France, but also in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and elsewhere.35 Vichy’s persecution had created a Jewish “community,” unifying the destiny of Jews from across different histories and identities in mainland France or Algeria.36 From the war of 1967 onwards, unified once again, this identification with community grew stronger. It was a time of numerous university projects and films concerning the Holocaust in the United States. Researchers studied and published America’s abandonment of European Jews in the 1930s, but one cannot find obsessive accusation of the American or British governments, as in France. The difference was that American Jews felt supported by their country in their solidarity with Israel.

For the Jews of France, in contrast, the feeling of abandonment or incomprehension by de Gaulle produced an intensification of the trauma, which revived the Vichy persecution in an unspeakable connection. Vichy was the enemy, the historical enemy, the expected enemy, because anti-Semitism had been a powerful political ideology since the Dreyfus Affair, but a provisionally victorious enemy, “carried in the luggage” of the Nazi victory. But de Gaulle was the protecting father, the savior of the nation, the admirable man, the untouchable hero.

Imagine that you are a child: You come home from school and tell your father that your sworn enemy has beaten you up, and some hours later your father replays not the

34 Vidal-Naquet added: “that with which we have unconditional solidarity is the existence of the State of Israel.”

35 To the testimonies of Aron and Vidal-Naquet, we add that of Daniel Cohn-Bendit†(Harris and Sédouy, 1979:176):
   - What is the turning point in your life?
   - It’s “the” war…
   - The Second World War?
   - No.
   - The Algerian War?
   - But no! “the” war: that of the Six Days in 1967… Until then, I was Jewish without any great problems. Like my brother said: “One is Jewish like one is a redhead!…” That went for the both of us. He’s a redhead as well. Then with the Six Day War, bam! Problem! I remember that I was taking an exam at the time. I left every hour to listen to the news. I didn’t say anything to anyone but I was worried. … It was unconscious, I didn’t theorize it but, in fact, I was cut in two.

36 Jacques Frémontier speaks of the “trauma” of 1940: “One didn’t escape from a solidarity with the persecuted. If it hadn’t been for 1940, most likely all trace of Judaism would have been radically effaced from my consciousness” (Harris and Sédouy, 1979:187).
gestures, but the words, of this sworn enemy and claims you are wrong. What would wound you the most: the physical attack of this enemy or the wounding words of your father, who has not understood your anguish and who abandons you.37

Furthermore, attacking de Gaulle would risk aggravating the accusation of a double allegiance already uttered in the course of the Six Day War, against which a response was difficult, since solidarity with the State of Israel seems obvious for the Jews of France, without questioning their loyalty to or affiliation with France.38 Even if they felt it, the Jews could not say, “de Gaulle betrayed us,” because he was untouchable. If, moreover, we return to the “obsessional“ critiques addressed to Vichy—it is a taboo subject; they are hiding something from us; the archives are forbidden—we should note that, while unjustified for Vichy, they do hold for the historical object “de Gaulle“: de Gaulle remains a taboo heroic character. Here the archives really are barely accessible and the works of historical critique on de Gaulle are few.39 My hypothesis is, therefore, that, if some French Jews turn obsessively against Vichy, which could be attacked without risk of refutation, the truth is that they want to attack de Gaulle, but still cannot do so for the reasons I have just explained.

The Muslims of Algeria: A forgotten history

With respect to the Algerian Muslims and their children, nationality is at the heart of their explicit questionings. As Abdelmalek Sayad remarks,

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37 Alberto Eiguer (1998:100) speaks of the infantile distress of the danger provoked by unforeseeability “outside of all expectation,” the situation in which the child who discovers the deception of a parent finds itself.

38 Jacob Kapan, who was received by de Gaulle some days later, reported that in his mind this phrase was grist to the mill for anti-Semites, while in the mind of de Gaulle “it was a compliment that he gave to the Jews.” De Gaulle added, “One can be a very good French citizen and a very good Jew devoted to the Israeli cause”(Harris and Sédouy, 1979:56-57). Asked in 1968, on the risk of double allegiance that the solidarity manifested by the Jews of France for Israel in 1967 would spread across the French nation, Emmanuel Lévinas responded:

Truth and destiny… do not belong in political and national categories. They do not menace any more the allegiance to France than do other spiritual adventures. To be a Jew fully consciously, to be a Christian fully consciously, is always to find oneself ill at ease [porte-à-faux] in Being. You also, friend Muslim, my enemy without hate of the Six Day War! But it is to such adventures run by its citizens that a great modern State, that is to say a servant of humanity, owes its greatness, its attention to the present and its presence in the world (1968:617-623).

39 We should note a sniggering attempt on the part of Stéphane Zagdanski (2000).
Algerian immigrants… find themselves in a relation completely exceptional with respect to French nationality. Algerian independence had the logical and immediate effect of a change in the political status of the “immigrants”…: overnight, the same immigrants who, in the past, were made French by a series of collective measures, became in their vast majority and through another collective measure Algerian immigrants, that is immigrants like the others (1999:327).

Later, however, their children became French automatically by the effect of the double *jus soli* which attributes nationality to a child born in France from a parent born in France: Algeria was France before 1962 and these children born in France after 1962 most often had parents born in Algeria before 1962. Some had wanted to refuse this French nationality, but finally accepted it from 1983 onwards in the context of acceptance of the permanent character of their settling in France, as well as abandonment of the “myth” of return to Algeria. An evolution took place among those who, some years before, could proclaim their refusal to be French “against their will,” an evolution finely analyzed by Abdelmalek Sayad:

...the beneficiaries of the [French] nationality, acquired without having applied for it, adapt to their situation well, and protestations of circumstance (which can be perfectly sincere in other respects) cannot convince to the contrary. Their circle, who would not have accepted an act of naturalization that would have followed the ordinary process, appear relieved, afterwards, that French nationality (“French papers”, as one says) occurred by itself, as a constraint collectively imposed: it is the lot common to all and not the result of an individual and voluntary act by which some called attention to themselves and separated themselves from the others. […] Despite protestations of all sorts that are the right thing to proclaim, despite the guilt or simple unease that continues to be felt by the naturalized, the naturalization that one calls “forced”, finally produces something like a satisfaction which, for a whole series of reasons, asks to remain secret and, sometimes, resigned to (1999:352).

It was during this time, in the middle of the 1980s, that contestation–from the extreme or traditional Right–of the *jus soli* directly targeted the children of Algerians. This culminated in 1993, when a reform of the French nationality law was passed, obliging children whose parents had not been born in France to ask to be French, rather than granting them nationality automatically at their majority.

Stéphane Beaud, speaking of one of the young “Nassims” who was the subject of his recent sociological inquiry published in *80% au bac… et après*, writes:

In the final analysis, his relation to Algeria can no longer be understood independently of the collective history of his generation. Algeria will remain for
Nassim, no matter what, “his” country, that is, the place where no one will ever be able to challenge his right to inhabit, where he is “naturally” (and legally) “at home”. This claim of belonging to Algeria took form in France in the years 1986—1995…These are the years during which, we see it well with the passage of time, the children of Maghrebian immigrants, centrally targeted by the reform of the nationality laws, felt in some way that they had become unwanted on French soil, that they were simply tolerated. They were also years when those born in France of Algerian parents had to learn to see themselves against their will as Français de papier (2002:267).

The children of Algerians were not legally and practically affected by this reform (the majority of them were French since birth, as a result of the double jus soli), but they felt targeted symbolically. What could explain in 1993–ten years after the marche des beurs, which signified a claim and a will to belong to France and to be recognized as French—this distancing and this “return” to the homeland of their fathers? The difficulties, never overcome, of finding housing or a job? The daily experience of discrimination and racism in housing or the workplace?

Most likely, this context contributed to this “disidentification,” but I cannot help think that the extreme sensitivity of this debate, the shock felt and the trauma that it could engender are all related to that which symbolically returns these descendants of Algerian Muslims to the former status already suffered by their parents in colonial Algeria. The latter were “officially” French, but they could not become this fully without demanding it. Only in colonial Algeria had France pushed as far the distance between the words of the law and the experience lived, and emptied from their contents the term itself of nationality and moreover the collection of proclamations, “fictions” of the Republican law. The trauma transmitted by previous generations was thus reactivated in the contemporary debate. Those of the Left, who sometimes proposed granting citizenship without nationality, had closed, in a certain way without knowing it, the circle of the Algerian regression. Citizenship was proposed by Blum and Viollette to thousands of Algerian Muslims, not being able to grant them full nationality. In the 1980s, a debate that had already taken place in Algeria had thus been transferred, as Benjamin Stora (1999) shows so well, from the former colony to mainland France, symbolically returning the children of these emigrants to the homeland of their parents.

This hypersensitivity, that one could judge as almost irrational, is thus better understood if we note that, as in the case of the Jews, it is the double rejection that provokes the traumatic neurosis (on the importance of the second shock, see Barrois,

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40 The Algerian Muslims could have experienced what psychoanalysts name “strain trauma”: “The entire life of the child would be progressively modified by its repeated submission to excitations, frustrations, tensions, humiliations, threats; or even to real dangers, brutalities; to abuses” (Dayan, 1995:24).
At least the Jews have had the chance to deal with their wound by investing in Vichy an obsessional neurosis. In the same way, the young descendents of Algerian Muslims can put their energy into a mythical identification with Algeria as seen in a France-Algeria soccer match.

This is not the case for a minority among the descendents of Algerian Muslims in France—the harkis “repatriated” in mainland France, often against the will of the French government, when their lives were in danger. For them, the psycho-collective situation is less favorable: like the Jews, they are angry at the untouchable de Gaulle who abandoned them, but they cannot—like the Jews—turn obsessively against an object, for example, Algeria, or seek refuge there mythically, like the young Franco-Algerians spoken of above (see Pervillé, 2003; Ageron, 2000; Hamoumou, 1990). “They can no longer go back, take again their place among their own, and have never found in France the integration for which they hoped. In Algeria, they are no longer anything, if not traitors. Here they will never be anything but Arabs” (J.P. Dubois, 1988:214).

Conclusion

Initially, we had four categories of French citizens subject to discrimination in matters of nationality. Ultimately, two of these four categories of discrimination—that of the French state against the Jews and that of the French Republic against Algerian Muslims during the colonial period—have left traces that are translated into a feeling of discrimination or non-recognition, which exist beyond the discrimination suffered today in the reality of daily life.

In both these cases, there was a second event—the discourse of de Gaulle in 1967 or the reform of nationality laws in 1993—that reactivated the painful past and provoked disidentification. This second event occurred during a time of formal equality of rights, and yet harked back to a time of discrimination. But the connection is unspeakable for the Jews and confused for the Muslims. The application of psychoanalysis to history thus overturns the hierarchy of scales (jeux d’échelles): a short sentence by de Gaulle in 1967, a reform that targeted a group symbolically but not directly, can have an impact as important, from the point of view of collective identities, as massive facts duly stated.

41 Jean-Paul Dubois “metaphorically” compared the situation of the harkis to those left-handers forced to write with their right hand who could never again become the true left-handers that they are and not feel right, nor will ever feel right in a family of right-handers.

42 In order to explain psychic phenomena linked to traumas, André Green points out “that it does not seem to him right to return to the oldest trauma... What must be taken into account is the grouping of diverse traumas that evoke one another, from which the reaction of the subject carries the denial of what they can together put in communication for the psyche” (2000:760-761).
These hypotheses of unspeakable and confused connections call for more historical work. To create a better history of the Republic’s shadowy zones, must one take the risk of permanently engendering non-identification with the Nation and therefore permanently tarnishing the Republic? On the contrary. When the historian works to pass from the history that is recounted (Historie), the legend of sorts, to the history that took place (Geschichte), Michel de Certeau reminds us that the work then becomes an event: “Because it does not repeat, it has the effect of changing history-legend into history-work” (1975:340).

To establish or make possible again identification with the Republic, more history of colonization—or rather of colonizations—needs to go beyond the Algerian war. The durable experiences of domination have marked and anchored themselves in the habitus of practices, lived experiences and representations for certain groups, and such domination has continued through concrete gaps between juridical discourses and practices. When these historical practices are not sufficiently analyzed and dealt with, they merge into contemporary experience in destructive and confusing ways (see Nacira Guenif-Souilamas, “En finir avec l’impensé colonial,” Libération (rubrique Rebonds), January 24, 2002). Antoine Raybaud shows that, since the time of colonization, an important phenomenon—noted also by Laurent Dubois (1998) for the status of slavery during the French Revolution—has been the uncoupling of the colonial presence and the French horizon:

from the interwar period, mainland France, in its difference from colonial practices, will have constituted for the colonized also an example of a way of life, a system of knowledge, a political organization, a capacity for social critique—at the limit, the example to brandish against the colonial scene (1997:96).

More works of very contemporary history are needed, which tackle the contradictions between postwar politics and the men who symbolized them. Already various research studies have shown the tension that existed in the politics of immigration and nationality at Liberation between an ethnic conception of the nation and an egalitarian conception indifferent to origin. De Gaulle supported the former but, faced with a strong reaction from several resistant jurists—Teitgen, Parodi, Cassin and Tissier—was won over to the

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43 This history is difficult to study for the reasons given by Antoine Raybaud, notably because “whatever had been the horrors of the phases of conquest and repression, and the work of constant dehumanization of the colonial era and the forms of forced labor, colonization is a phenomenon more mixed…[It] conceals an entanglement of logics and heterogeneous practices, as well as different scales of these practices and logics” (1997:95).
latter. At certain moments, it was thus left to others than de Gaulle to incarnate the “Republican” values of equality and fraternity, and historical work is able to show this.

To know and teach the history of colonization and slavery and of historical traumas more generally, to take into account collective memories that are particular and different from a dominant and central memory, is a way of forming a link between citizens of different pasts and memories. Even if there were no slaves in Savoie and Côtes d’Amor, every French person ought to be able to understand and thus learn a little of the history of the others in order to feel that they all belong to the same community of citizens. This perception of the history of others is what de Gaulle lacked in 1962 in order to not strike the harkis, and in 1967 in order to take into account the lived experience and sensitivity of French Jews. It was also what the Right majority lacked during the reform of nationality laws in 1993 in order to recall the history of legal discrimination in colonial Algeria.

Finally, to accept with confidence the diversity of affiliations is to implement in the general policy of the State that which has already been accepted in the domain of nationality. Confronted in 1922 with the legal situation of Germans living in Alsace-Lorraine who wanted to become French while preserving their nationality of origin, the French Parliament accepted the principle of dual nationality: “One should admit, unless it is proved otherwise, that a person having acquired French nationality is not suspect nor dangerous by the sole fact that they keep moral and financial interests in the country that they have left” (emphasis mine), concluded the rapporteur of this bill (M. Eccard, Doc. parl. Sénat, December 7, 1922, no. 734).

References


44 On the opposition between the ethnic and republican approaches to the nation, see Cofas (2000), Weil (1995), and Noiriel (1988).
History and memory of discrimination in France


Patrick Weil


