- to seek clarity of thought
Frege - pay attention to "ideas"

What is philosophically important about the use of language?
* Clarifying meaning
  → logic
* Study of inferences

The Great Philosophical Project: Great philosophers show us how to say something new or something that needs to be said.
  → progression in society
  → progression in philosophy

* Different ideas based upon different reference & senses
  → painter, horseman & zoologist example of names
  → Moon example
  → uncertain connection between words & ideas

Truth value

8131 On Sense & Reference - Frege
"Uber Sinn & Bedeutung"

If we want to study language, we must ask:
What do we mean by the meaning of an expression - if we want to study language systematically, scientifically & rigorously?

1 Locke - language & mind
* When we speak of meaning, meaning are the ideas with which expressions are
Locke: "Thesis" - associated ideas

- these are private & personal
- no two people can have the same ideas
- "only" subjective
- essentially private
- non-sharable, non-comparable

*un-criticizable - major problem

in different Consciousnesses

Frege: The worry is when:
we try to communicate

but how do we truly measure this

Distinguish language from communication.
a vehicle for vast difference

objective: independently of being perceived

against which you can throw something
pushes against you

you may want to get through it, but you can't

how it is independent of how it may be taken to be

you could be wrong
Meanings = ideas

- you get a humpty dumpty of meaning
- it is just what I mean it to be
- becomes arbitrary

Problem w/ Subjectivity:

We would lose objectivity
- everything would become normative
  - there is a way concepts should be meant
    - but then we lose the sense in which a meaning should be anchored
    - right way or wrong way

- some things are wholly subjective
  - favorites, likes

2) Mill: meanings are the referents of our terms

"Antithesis"

Example: The Semantics of first order predicate logic.

- Every name is assigned a denotation (that is out in the world) and every predicate letter is assigned an extension (the set of objects that fall under that predicate)

Cat

Ł set of all cats

Sentences are assigned truth values
Frege: reference glut

Major Problems
1. Co-Referring Names
   - Samuel Clemens
   - Mark Twain
   - The Author of the First American novel written on a typewriter

If meaning is just reference, these would all be identical

Judgements - difference

Cognitive Value:

SC = SC
nothing new

SC = MT
informative

Compositionality - these judgements have subential components

→ difference in the names

→ which means

→ if meaning = referents

→ this cannot be so

Frege: Therefore, we must have sense
The present king of France is bald.

→ not meaninglessness, but it doesn't seem to refer to anything

Charles Dodgson
The author of *Alice in Wonderland*
The author of *Through the Looking glass*

→ different meaning, but it refers to the same individual

= it is an informative
they have different cognitive value according to Frege
Frege creates the idea of sense:
metaphor: telescope & the moon

- They can be shared
- Views of the objective image are going to vary
- Too subject to be meaningful

Senses (according to Frege): modes of presentation of a referent
- Images are utterly dependent upon the thing that actually exists
  - You cannot have an image without a referent
  - You cannot get an image of nothing

- Without a referent, we can still get a telescopic image
  - King of France example

Problems:
- Images are utterly dependent upon the thing that actually exists
  - You cannot have an image without a referent
  - You cannot get an image of nothing

- This runs side by side with the empty names
  - This leads to a subjective image because it lacks a referent
Theory of Philosophy
→ how do we develop a theory of sense that avoids Frege's problem.
   Frege says this desiderata want to say it, but you don't say much

we need senses, but he doesn't say much about it
→ we want more, though, in developing a complete theory of senses

Sense without truth value
- king of France example

* there is much that is still to be developed in a meaning theory

Bertrand Russell: "The Referentialist's Revenge"
* there is no vocabulary for the meaning of senses
→ we must look to the referents for this

* Alice: "I see Nobody."
White King: "Is he bald?"
→ The mistake is to think of "Nobody" as a referring expression.
Russellian analysis of definite descriptions

The present King of France is bald.

\[ (\exists x) \left( PKOF(x) \land (\forall y) \left( PKOF(y) \rightarrow x = y \right) \right) \]

Existence & uniqueness assertion
(He exists) & (only one)

*only variables, no names

\[ \neg (\exists x) (Alice \text{ sees } x) \]

It is not the case that there exists a quantifier which Alice sees

\[ \rightarrow \text{ the king is thinking of not a proper name} \]

The author of Alice in Wonderland is L.C.

\[ (\exists x) (AAW(x) \land x \text{ is only one } \land x = LC) \]

The author of Through the Looking-Glass can account for the difference in referring expressions associated with separate definite descriptions

\[ (\exists x) (ATL(x) \land x \text{ is only one } \land x = LC) \]
Empty Terms:

Truth Value of Russellian Analysis is false because the first part is false. It is a conjunctive.

The author of Alice in Wonderland.

The author of T. T. L. G.

Lewis Carroll
Charles Dodgson

Intuitively, they do not have the same meaning.

What if they then come w/ associated w/ distinct linguistic definite descriptions?

Can come apart from this because the D. D are different.

Lewis Carroll - disguised D. D.
(The author of A. W.)

Charles Dodgson
(The son of Emily)

\[ \text{it just comes down to the equation over there} \]