Philosophy of Science: Second Paper Topics

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
PHIL 313, Sec. 01: TTh 3:30pm-4:50pm in 221 Blair Hall
The College of William and Mary
Fall 2003

Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jawoo2@wm.edu
Course Webpage: http://fsweb.wm.edu/jawoo2/wm/wmphilsci.htm
Office Hours: T 5pm-6:30pm, W 10am-11:30am, and by appointment
Office: 126 Blair Hall
Office Phone: 221-2713
Dept. Phone: 221-2735

SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of the following topics, and write a 5-7 page paper completing the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due in my mailbox at the Dept. by 3pm Wednesday, Dec. 10th.

Topics:

1. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn criticizes traditional views about observation and scientific methodology. What are these traditional views and what alternative understandings does Kuhn offer? Be sure to explain the reasons he gives for his claims. Kuhn's views on these matter (especially on observation) are the basis for certain radical conclusions he draws (mainly in Ch. X) about the results of paradigm change and, consequently, the nature of progress in science. Explain what he thinks about these issues, being sure to cover how he derives his conclusions. In "The Current Status of Scientific Realism," Richard Boyd claims that Kuhn's anti-realist conclusions are not the only ones it is possible to draw from his understanding of observation and scientific methodology. What alternative conclusions does Boyd propose, and what are his reasons for drawing them? If we accept Kuhn's views on observation and methodology, who should we side with about science in general, Kuhn or Boyd? Support your position on this issue.

2. In "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism" (and "To Save the Phenomena"), Bas van Fraassen offers an understanding of science he calls "Constructive Empiricism" (CE). How does this view differ from the earlier empiricist view, Logical Empiricism (LE), and how is it related to Scientific Realism (SR)? As an empiricist, van Fraassen appeals to an underdetermination (or evidential indistinguishability) thesis in arguing that the most we can rationally strive for in scientific inquiry is empirically adequate theories. What does he mean by this, and how does this argument proceed? (Ellis, pp. 166-169 and Boyd, pp. 42-44 might help here.) Explain how van Fraassen's conclusion relies on an observable/unobservable distinction. How does he understand and support this distinction? Is the distinction, as he understands it, viable? If so, should we agree with van Fraassen about science? If the distinction is not viable, what understanding of science should we adopt instead of CE? Give reasons supporting your views here.

3. In "The Current Status of Scientific Realism," Richard Boyd offers an argument for Scientific Realism (SR) that he claims succeeds where earlier ones failed. How did these earlier realist responses to empiricist and constructivist critiques ultimately fail on his view? Explain Boyd's new argument for SR, being sure to cover how it differs in focus from earlier ones and why he thinks it avoids their weaknesses. Next, consider the type of reasoning or argumentative strategy Boyd employs. In "The Natural Ontological Attitude," Arthur Fine criticizes the use of this sort of strategy in arguing for SR. What is it about Boyd's argument that makes it problematic? How does Boyd respond to Fine's critique? (See Boyd, pp. 65-68 and 72-74, in particular.) Does Fine's criticism show that SR is unjustified, or does Boyd defend his argument and view adequately? Give reasons for your assessment.