LANGUAGE AND MIND

PHIL 345, Sec. 001: TTh 11:30am-1pm in 3437 Mason Hall
The University of Michigan
Winter 2005



Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jwood@umich.edu
Course Webpage: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jwood/umich/Phil345.htm
Office Hours: T 2pm-3:30pm, W 1pm-2pm, and by appointment
Office: 2200 Angell Hall
Office Phone: 615-6537
Dept. Phone: 764-6285

FIRST PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of following topics and write a 4-6 page paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due at the beginning of class (11:30am) on Thursday, February 17th.

Topics:

1. One of the puzzles about language we have considered is the problem of empty names -- names that do not pick out any objects and so have no bearers (no references, no semantic-values). This phenomenon includes both fictional names, like 'Santa Claus' and 'Sherlock Holmes' as well as expressions not tied to works of fiction, like 'Vulcan' (the name for the hypothetical planet between Mercury and the Sun postulated by a 19th century astronomical theory). What exactly is the problem of empty names, that is, why do they present a puzzle? Explain and contrast the different ways that Meinong (as related by Russell), Frege, and Russell try to deal with this puzzle. Explain their views in your own words, but be sure to make citations to the relevant articles when discussing this. What objections do these views face? Do you think any of them is adequate? Next, consider Kripke's views about how names get their reference. How might he explain the phenomenon of empty names? Does Kripke's approach offer a better account than the earlier views, or is the phenomenon of empty names a more serious problem for him? Be sure to back up your position here with reasons.

2. Another puzzle about language we have considered is the informativenss of certain identity claims. What exactly is the puzzle here? In Naming and Necessity, Kripke maintians that all identity claims employing singular names or natural-kind terms ("general" names) are necessarily true, if true. What is about the way these sorts of expressions work on his view that makes this the case? How does this differ from how they work on the traditional "Descritivist" accounts of these expressions? Explain, in your own words, how Kripke uses this difference as an argument against that sort of account. While, on Kripke's view, these identity claims are all necessary when true, he still maintains that the non-trivial ones, like 'Hesperus is Phorphorus' and 'Water is H2O' (those not of the form a = a), can be known only a posteriori. Explain how on Kripke's view these necessarily true claims can end up having this epistemic status (note: this point is somewhat subtle). Why might a posteriori necessity seem counter-intuitive? Do Kripke's views solve the puzzle of informative identity claims completely? Explain. While you should try to say things in your own words as much as possible, be sure to give citations to the Kripke material when discussing it.