JAMES A. WOODBRIDGE
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I am a somewhat recent transplant to Las Vegas and (now) an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at UNLV. This Spring (2013) I am teaching Philosophy of Language and Introduction to Symbolic Logic. In Fall 2012 I co-taught (with Prof. Ian Dove) Philosophy of Mathematics and Advanced Logic, along with my own section of Introduction to Philosophy. In other recent terms I have taught Theories of Truth, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science. Before coming to UNLV, I was a reluctant academic nomad, teaching at such institutions as Yale University (2005-6), The University of Michigan (2004-5), The College of William and Mary (2001-4), and New York University (1999-2001). I've taught a variety of classes at these different places, including Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, and a First-Year Seminar on Relativism.
I am (in origin and demeanor) a northeasterner. I grew up in Glastonbury, Connecticut but managed to escape the suburbs every summer at Camp Quinebarge in New Hampshire, where I spent most of my time hiking in the White Mountains. I did an undergraduate degree at Amherst College in Massachusetts where I also devoted a lot of time to singing, both in the men's Glee Club and in an a cappella group called the DQ. During my college years I spent three summers living in a tent and working outrageous hours at the Columbia Wards salmon fishery in Kenai, Alaska. After graduating from Amherst with a double major in philosophy and physics, I spent a year traveling around the world, mostly in New Zealand, Australia, China, Thailand, Nepal, India, Italy, Germany, and Croatia. When I got back to the U.S. I lived in Boston for two years and worked as a research technician at the Harvard School of Public Health. My (rather strange) job there was to make computer models of human and dog rib cages for use in the study of respiratory mechanics. (Here is an abstract.) From Boston I moved to Ann Arbor to pursue a graduate degree in philosophy at the University of Michigan (Go Blue). I relocated to NYC in 1998 and then (after completing my Ph.D.) moved to Virginia in 2001 to teach at William & Mary. Three years later I returned to Ann Arbor to spend a year teaching for my old alma mater (Go Blue, uh, again). After that, I ended up back in my old home state of CT for a year, teaching at Yale. Now here I am in the middle of a desert, in the craziest city on earth.
Outside of academic pursuits, one of my main interests has been rock climbing (here are some pictures), although unfortunately that's been on hold for a while (but hooray! for Red Rock Canyon!). I used to fool around with beer brewing, but I don't really do much of that anymore. My main interest these days is music, mostly "indie" rock (as in The Shins, The Fiery Furnaces, Yo La Tengo) and early 70s rock (as in Zeppelin (of course), T. Rex, Big Star), blues, post-war jazz, real country music (as in Hank Williams, Loretta Lynn, Johnny Cash), and bluegrass/old time. I now book indie rock shows in several venues in Downtown Las Vegas, and I co-organize the twice-yearly Neon Reverb Festival. I also like movies from the 30's and 40's, traveling(!), and camping. And then, of course, there is the wonderful Lisa and our dogs, Rufus and Baxter! (Scout, I'm going to miss you, you funny beast.)
My philosophical interests include the philosophy of language and mind,
metaphysics, and philosophical logic. I mainly focus on the topic of truth and have developed (most recently, in collaboration with Bradley Armour-Garb) a novel analysis of truth-talk (the fragment of language that employs the notion of truth). The view has connections with deflationism about truth (a general approach that also is really more an analysis of truth-talk than one of truth itself, although it has implications for that more traditional issue). Deflationism holds that all of our uses of truth-talk are explained by the fact that it generates the instances of the equivalence schema: it is true that p if and only if p. The instances of this schema are explanatorily and conceptually basic, in the sense that they follow just from how truth-talk operates (logico-linguisitically) rather than from the underlying nature of some property of truth. Deflationism thus denies that truth-talk functions to describe anything (e.g., a statement or a belief) or to attribute any kind of substantial relation (more on this here). According to deflationism, the only purposes truth-talk really serves are certain logical or pragmatic ones. The related analysis of truth-talk that I have developed is a kind of fictionalism about truth-talk, one that sees this way of talking as part of an established, rule-governed semantic pretense. Truth-talk is a pretense-based figure of speech we employ in order make certain non-semantic claims (in particular, a certain kind of general claim) we could not otherwise make.
My curriculum vitae has more information about my work and background.
My paper "Truth as a Pretense" lays out the basic details of my original views on truth-talk. A (much) shorter "talk-version" is available here.
And the full-length dissertation version is available here.
Other recent papers:
At University of Nevada, Las Vegas:At Yale University:
- Philosophy of Language (Syllabus)
Spring 2013, Fall 2010, Fall 2008- Philosophy of Mathematics (Syllabus)
Fall 2012- Theories of Truth (Syllabus)
Spring 2012, Fall 2007- Metaphysics (Syllabus)
Fall 2011, Spring 2010- Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)
Spring 2011- Advanced Logic (Syllabus)
Fall 2012, Fall 2009, Spring 2009- Introduction to Symbolic Logic (Syllabus)
Spring 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008- Introduction to Philosophy (Syllabus)
Fall 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008- Symbolic (a.k.a. Mathematical) Logic (Syllabus)
Spring 2008, Spring 2007- Critical Thinking (Syllabus)
Fall 2007- Introduction to Formal Logic (Syllabus)
Spring 2007, Fall 2006At The University of Michigan:
- Philosophy of Mind (Syllabus)
Spring 2006- Directed Studies: Philosophy (Syllabus)
Spring 2006- Seminar: Theories of Truth (Syllabus)
Fall 2005- Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)
Fall 2005At The College of William and Mary:
- Undergraduate Seminar: Theories of Truth (Syllabus)
Winter 2005- Language and Mind (Syllabus)
Winter 2005- Problems of Philosophy (Syllabus)
Fall 2004- First Year Seminar: Relativism (Syllabus)
Fall 2004At New York University:
- Philosophy of Language (Syllabus)
Spring 2004 and Spring 2002- Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)
Fall 2003- Freshman Seminar: Relativism (Syllabus)
Spring 2003- Metaphysics (Syllabus)
Fall 2002- Symbolic Logic (Syllabus)
Spring 2003 and Fall 2001- Introduction to Philosophy (Syllabus)
Spring 2004, Fall 2003, Spring and Fall 2002, Fall 2001
- Metaphysics (Syllabus)
Summer 2001- Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)
Summer 2001- Ethics (Syllabus)
Spring 2001 and Fall 2000- Introduction to Philosophy (Syllabus)
Fall 2000- Philosophy of Mind (Syllabus)
Fall 1999