Publications

“A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Policy Positions from Texts” with Sven-Oliver Proksch. Forthcoming July 2008 in American Journal of Political Science 52(3).

Abstract: Recent advances in computational methods for extracting party positions from political texts have provided scholars promising new ways for estimating party positions. We add to this literature by developing a new scaling technique to estimate positions based on word frequencies in political texts, which we model as a Poisson process. Our approach has advantages over current methods. It is more systematic and much less time consuming than hand coding of party manifestos or conducting expert surveys. Unlike the computer word scoring methodology by Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003), our method does not require the use of reference texts, the selection of which may greatly influence the estimation process. Lastly, we believe our approach is the first which produces party position estimates which can be used accurately as time-series data. Using simulations, we first demonstrate that our scaling technique produces accurate ideal point estimates. We then estimate the positions of German political parties from 1990-2005 from word frequencies in party manifestos using our R program WORDFISH. The extracted positions correspond well with the conventional wisdom on German politics and correlate highly with positions obtained using other methods.

“Bargaining Power at Europe’s Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories.” (January 2008) International Organization 62(1).

This paper examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences, the grand bargains where many key institutional changes are made. Using data on member state preferences from the intergovernmental conference leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I test competing bargaining theories, institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism. I present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power, derive a statistical model directly from this formal model, and then use data from EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources. Veto power associated with institutional models better explains intergovernmental conference outcomes compared to power from size and economic might, often associated with intergovernmental analyses.

“Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy? Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform.” (September 2007) With Christian Jensen and Thomas König. European Union Politics 8(3).

What drove the institutional preferences of EU constitutional convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates’ preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. If government and national interests would dominate any policy area, it would be foreign policy. We find significant partisan effects in a constitutional convention tasked with making such fundamental choices as the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We contend that our finding in this critical case underscores how widespread, if not universal, partisan effects are in European integration.

“From Unanimity to Consensus: An Analysis of the Negotiations at the EU’s Constitutional Convention” (April 2006) with Thomas König. World Politics 58(3).

In spite of the recent failure of two referendums, the drafting of a constitution for the second biggest economic power in the world, the European Union (EU), is perhaps one of the most important political events of our time. If the constitution, or a revised version of it, comes into force, several important questions will emerge: How did an increased number of member states reach a conclusion, while a lower number had failed at previous intergovernmental attempts? In particular, how did the constitutional convention differ from previous intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) at which the EU drafted its treaty documents in the past? How can we explain the outcomes of the convention which lead to redistribution of power and resources among 25 or more member states? This study examines how the EU’s constitutional convention differed from previous IGCs and finds that the convention was governed by consensus, while the rewriting of the EU’s treaties in the past had always required unanimity. Using a formal model and survey data to capture the positions of convention delegates, we firstly specify the level of consensus, which we find was higher than simple majority rule. Since this threshold also impacted who won and lost at the convention, we secondly examine the sources of bargaining power, such as delegates’ distance to the status quo, distance to the median, population size, and domestic constraints. Our results confirm several findings in the EU bargaining and two-level game literature, such as actors closer to the status quo hold a stronger bargaining position, while actors from larger member states are no more or less likely to win at the negotiating table than actors from smaller states.

“Institutions and Coalition Formation: the German Election of 2005.” (May 2006) with Sven-Oliver Proksch. West European Politics 29(3).

The German election of 2005 creates three puzzles for the literature on coalition formation. First, the election led to a rare event in German politics and in parliamentary systems more generally, a “grand coalition” between the two largest parties. Second, we demonstrate that a minority government, something which has never occurred in postwar Germany, was in fact one of the two most likely coalitions to form. Third, the parties of the left retained a comfortable majority in the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, however they did not form a coalition. The election of 2005 appears unique in German politics, but we argue that its outcome is easily understood using existing institutional theories of coalition formation. We examine party positions in two dimensions (economic and social) using computer-based word scoring of party manifestos (Laver et al. 2003). We demonstrate that the conditions for a SPD minority government were present in Germany due to its central location in the policy space. While the configuration of policy positions would thus have allowed the SPD to form a minority government, the role of the Federal President as a veto player could have prevented it from forming, and the presence of an opposition controlled upper house would have decreased its effectiveness. The mere possibility of forming a minority government gave the SPD a bargaining advantage in the coalition negotiations with the CDU CSU. We show that in the final portfolio allocation, the SPD received ministries which control approximately two thirds of the federal budget.

Click here for replication materials.

“Who is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences.” (2006). European Union Politics 7(1).

Previous studies have proposed competing theories to explain European intergovernmental conference (IGC) outcomes, but they fail to test these theories against one another. I examine the literature on IGC bargaining and derive several testable hypotheses. Using data on member state preferences at the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I first examine which member states favor integration and which are most skeptical of integration. I also determine which member states face the highest domestic ratification constraints. I then test the competing hypotheses found in the literature by calculating the bargaining strength of member states. I find that large member states have no more bargaining strength than the average member state; instead, domestic ratification constraints seem to confer power. States preferring less integration appear to outperform states desiring more integration. Supranational actors, as expected, have little power.

For data and replication information, please read the replication notes first, then download the data and do files.

“Bringing Parliaments Back In: The Sources of Power in European Treaty Negotiation.” (2004) with Thomas König. The Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(3).

We examine different potential sources of power available to parliamentary actors at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) of the European Union (EU). Using both open rule and closed rule bargaining models, we explore the power of the European Parliament (EP) and member-state parliaments at the Amsterdam IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. We empirically determine which actors have agenda-setting rights and if and when domestic constraints matter. Furthermore, we examine whether this influence differs across the various types of issues discussed at the IGC. Our findings demonstrate that supranational actors such as the EP may have some agenda-setting power over some types of issues. In general, though, the EP is weak. Hawkish domestic parliaments, on the other hand, can be source of power for member-state negotiating teams. We find evidence that domestic constraints may even be a more important source of power than first-mover rights.