Article Abstracts
Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?
ABSTRACT: Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Field (1972), claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism-the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not make Tarski inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly of physicalism were written in unusual circumstances: Tarski was likely attempting to appease an audience of physicalists that he viewed as hostile to his ideas. In later sections I develop positive accounts of (i.) Tarski's reduction of semantic concepts, (ii.) Tarski's motivation to develop formal semantics, and (iii.) the role physicalism plays in Tarski's thought.
OUTLINE
1. Introduction: The received view of Tarski's motivations
2. Tarski's apparent endorsement of physicalism
3. Tarski's reduction of semantic concepts to non-semantic ones
4. What did motivate Tarski's definition of truth?
5. Conclusion: Philosophical motives and scientific motives
How to Be an Anti-reductionist about Developmental Biology
ABSTRACT: Alexander Rosenberg recently claimed (1997) that developmental biology is currently being reduced to molecular biology. Laubichler & Wagner (2001) cite several concrete biological examples that are intended to impugn Rosenberg's claim. I first argue that although Laubichler and Wagner's examples would refute a very strong reductionism, a more moderate reductionism would escape their attacks. Next, taking my cue from the anti-reductionist's perennial stress on the importance of spatial organization, I describe one form an empirical finding that refutes this moderate reductionism would take. Finally, I point out an actual example, anterior-posterior axis determination in the chick, that challenges the reductionist's belief that all developmental regularities can be explained by molecular biology. In short, I argue that Rosenberg's position can be saved from Laubichler and Wagner's criticisms and putative counter-examples, but it would not survive a different kind of counter-example.